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LEGAL PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN CONTROLLING
AGRICULTUIJAL PRODUCTION
By

FRED

A. DEwEy*

As productive activities become more and more specialized,
individual members of society become increasingly dependent
upon each other for the satisfaction of their economic needs.
Specialization makes necessary an exchange before the individual can enjoy the full benefit of his productive efforts and
the reward for his contribution to the needs of others is measared, not by the social value of the contribution, but by its exchange value which is determined by the relation of the total
supply to the demand rather than the extent of the individual
contribution toward the satisfaction of the demand. Thus,
though it seems clear that a bountiful supply of food commodities is of more value to a world that harbors nations of starving
populations than a small supply, the exchange value of a small
supply is often far greater than it is for a large supply. As a
result of this the individuals who produce a small supply are
able to exact more in exchange for their product than if they
had produced a larger amount.
Other things being equal, the individual naturally prefers
to engage in the kind of production that will bring him the
greatest returns for his efforts. To the extent that this desire
results in accurate predictions of and production for social
needs rather than in production to satisfy the wants of those
most able to pay, it serves a useful social function. But specialized production, involving as it does a specialized training,
concentration and investment of capital, and adaptation to
available opportunities, requires that the individual, if he has
any choice in the matter, make his prediction and prepare to
act upon it considerably in advance of the actual engagement
in productive effort. Even in normal times the aggregate result
is very apt to lead to the development of productive capacities
out of proportion to the relative needs of society. Hence,
* Member of the Iowa and Ohio Bars; A. B., Iowa (1931); J. D.,
Iowa (1933); LL. M., Columbia (1934); President, Iowa Law Rev.
1932-33; contributor to various legal periodicals.
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adjustments must be made by the slhifting of some individuals
to other lines of endeavor. The existence of available opportunities tempers the individual hardships which must be suffered as a result of the necessity for such adjustments.
Abnormal stimulation of demand followed by the sudden
loss of markets, like a revolution in methods of production, may
lead to the necessity of adjustment to changed conditions by
the entire industry. American agriculture is faced with this
necessity. And there are no fields of production to which the
bankrupt farmers can turn at this time. This means that the
adjustment will have to be made, at least temporarily, within
the industry.
Since the war the productive capacity of American agriculture has been seriously out of balance with the available market
outlets. Prior to the war, American production of agricultural
commodities for export was gradually declining. The disruption of production in Europe brought about by the war and the
Russian revolution stimulated demand to such an extent that
other countries, including the United States, Canada, Argentina, and Australia, greatly expanded their production for export. American loans helped to finance this new demand for
agricultural products.
After the war the situation was radically changed. The
United States was, for the first time in history, a creditor nation. We loaned our money to Europe during the war and
refused to permit payment thereafter in the only manner in
which it was possible for her to pay, namely, in goods. Simultaneously, we demanded payment of war debts and raised our
tariff barriers against European goods. Europe could not pay
unless she sold more goods than she purchased. High tariffs
and unfavorable exchange rates made trade with the United
States unprofitable. The necessity of meeting war debts led
several of the European countries to impose import restrictions
in various forms. High tariffs, import quotas, import monopolies and licenses, and regulations requiring the use of a certain
proportion of domestic goods were among the methods used to
prevent the importation of goods. Another factor which led to
the same result was in the wave of intense nationalism which
swept over Europe after the war. The shortage of food experi-

CONTROLLING AGRICULTURAL

PRODUCTION

enced during the war served to foster such restrictions on imports as would tend to make them more self-sufficient. At no
time in history has there existed so many and such effective
barriers to world trade.'
These restrictive policies also made food prices considerably higher in those countries because of the higher cost of
producing agricultural conmnodities on the worn soil which they
are compelled to utilize. Higher food costs have led in turn to
decreased consumption of all but the cheaper foods. The total
result, therefore, has been an increased production in Europe,
excluding Russia, and a decreased consumption thus materially
lessening the foreign market for our agricultural products. 2
No doubt many of the restrictions on foreign trade which
exist today will not remain permanently. Bfut the situation
contains one. important factor which will permanently affect
our foreign markets for agricultural goods. The war demand
provided the impetus which led to great expansion of production in Canada, Argentina, and Australia. These countries
have many natural advantages over the United States in the
production of many agricultural commodities. Labor is cheaper
and the land is newer and more suited to mechanized farming.
With the improvement of their transportation facilities we can
expect 'an increasing burden from their competition. Soviet
Russia, also, is now in the- lime light as one of the major producing countries of the world having surpassed in the past few
years its pre-war production. 3 Here also we may expect greater
and greater difficulty in meeting competition in the foreign
markets. It appears probable that America will suffer a permanent dimunition of its European market for agricultural
products.

4

Expansion of production and contraction of exports naturally means a piling up of surpluses which must be disposed
of on the domestic market. The result has been the depression
of the unit price of farm commodities to such a low level that
lWorld Trade Barriers in Relation to Agriculture, Senate Document2 No. 170 (1933).
Ibid. See also, World Agriculture, An International Survey, Royal
Institute of International Affairs (1932).
'Ibid.

4Edwin G. Nourse, American Agriculture and the European
Market (1924).
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the purchasing power of the farmer has been practically destroyed. In relation to interest payments, taxes, payments on
existing obligations and prices that the farmer must pay for the
things he buys, the exchange value of his product has suffered
such a serious blow that the industry as a whole is practically
insolvent. It is not the purpose of this paper to portray in detail the all too familiar plight of the American farmer. It will
be assumed that an increase in the exchange value of farm
products in relation to the things -that farmers buy is desirable.
Agriculture, as an industry, is one of the few major producing groups that is unable materially to restrict production.
It is an industry that is carried on throughout the entire world
by individual farmers and peasants who control, individually,
such an insignificant -art of the total that, acting alone, they
cannot affect the market at all. The individual farmer has no
special market that he can affect by limiting his production and
hence cannot hope to affect the unit price of his product by restricting his output. His only hope for increasing his income
lies, therefore, in increasing the number of units he has for sale.
That is what all farmers have done with the result that the
point of diminishing returns has long since been reached. Increased effort on the part of the farmer, while adding to the
total wealth of society, has only served to furtheir impoverish
him. If substantial results are to be obtained, unified action is,
therefore, clearly necessary.
The primary aim of the farm relief legislation is to aid the
farmers in raising the exchange value of their products and to
restore their purchasing power by enabling them to act concertedly in reducing production. Prior to the Agricultural
Adjustment Act 5 (A. A. A.) unified action was not only a practical impossibility, due to the fact that non-cooperators reaped
the same benefits as the cooperatorg without the correlative
sacrifices, but it was also limited by the anti-trust laws to cooperation in the field of marketing.0 The A. A. A. legalizes unified action looking toward controlled output as well as marketing.7
5 Public No. 10, 73rd Congress, H. R. 3835 (1933).
6 The anti-trust laws did not extend to cooperation in the reduction
of production. Jennings and Sullivan, Legal Planning for Agriculture,
42 Y. L. J. 878, 891 (1933).
'A. A. A. supra, n. 5, Sec. 8 (1), (2), (3). Notice, however, that
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Colonel Leonard P. Ayres has characterized the A.A. A.
as a scheme designed to pay the farmer more for doing less.3
Paradoxical as this may seem, it is essentially true. -The policy
of the act is to assist the farmer in a unified reduction program
in order to establish a fair exchange value for agricultural
products in relation to the things that farmers buy.9 As long
as farmers receive less for a large crop than for a small one,
there should be nothing startling, at least to a business man,
in the suggestion that one way to remedy the situation is to
produce smaller crops, for that is the way the business man
meets the situation when it arises in his own business. 10
Whether this is the proper method of attacking the situation is
a question for the economist."- While such measures may be
necessary to solve the emergency needs of agriculture, the sensible solution for the future would seem to be to balance bargaining power by stimulating production in other fields rather
than reducing it in agriculture, and unless reduction in agriculture has that effect indirectly, reduction may tend to equalize bargaining power and at the same time result in lowering
12
the total wealth instead of increasing it.
the agreements for reduced production apply only to "basic" commodities unless "marketing agreements" which are exenpted from the antitrust laws in subsec. (2) are interpreted to include reduction agreements among producers. Subsec. (3) which provides for licensing
specifically makes the conditions and terms thereof subject to "existing
acts of Congress" which apparently includes the anti-trust laws.
Sec. 8 (1) is amended in the Cotton Control Act, H. R. 8402, 73d Congress, Mar. 20, 1934, Sec. 25, to allow agreements for the reduction of
production of "basic commodities" to include agreements for limiting
production of other than "basic" commodities.
sLeonard P. Ayres, Economics of Recovery (1933).
"A.A. A. supra, n. 5. Declaration of Policy.
10,"

.

under existing economic arrangements, most enterprises

must normally restrict output in order to maintain solvency." Slichter,
Modern Economic Society (1932), p. 5.
n See Edwin G. Nourse, Can Agriculture Affect Prices by Controlling Production? Proceedings of the Academy of Pol. Sci., Vol. XIV,
p. 5232 (Jan., 1932).
3 The numerous restrictions on production in various industrial
codes as well as the addition of some crops to the category of "basic
commodies" and the extension of the power to include non-basic commodities in reduction agreements regarding "basic" commodities gives
rise to the apprehension that production will, on the whole, be diminished, thereby impoverishing instead of enriching the nation. Increased
purchasing power and direct stimulation of production along other lines
may result in taking up the slack. See the report of the A. A. A.
1933-34 for a summary of its conclusions on the effect of the restrictions. On the whole it appears rather optimistic.
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But as long as business operates on a restricted basis, the
objection that it is a means of paying the farmer more for
doing less is not entitled to much consideration. And so long
as business continues to receive the aid of the protective tariff
as a means of exacting a higher price for its product than it
would otherwise receive, it is in no position to complain on the
ground that governmental action is being used to accomplish
the same results for agriculture. This is the obvious effect of
the tariff. 13 Business, like agriculture, would gain little by
restricting production if it had to compete on even terms with
the whole world:. But the protective tariff gives business a
market in which it may restrict production and receive more
for its product than it could if the market was open to unfettered foreign competition. And the more comes from those
with whom the exchange is made. Agriculture suffers a direct
decrease in the exchange value of its products due to the tariffs
which protect industrial products. The tariff has the effect of
restricting the amount of industrial goods shipped into this
country and the amount of agricultural products which must
be sold on the domestic market. 14 In other words the farmer
pays more for what he buys and gets less for what he sells.
And persons engaged in protected industries, in addition to receiving more for what they sell, are further benefited,-at least
temporarily, by lower prices of food products. It is not my intention to debate the merits of the tariff. If it has some value
in it besides increasing the bargaining power of industry over
agriculture, there seems to be nothing in the farm relief legislation to destroy that value. Unified action is clearly necessary
if substantial reduction is to be secured and this can be secured
only by governmental action. The problem involves two major
considerations. It involves those considerations relating to the
emergency or present needs of agriculture, and it involves the
adjustments which will be necessary to meet the problems which
arise out of increased competition in the world markets. bue
to the present drastic curtailment of foreign markets, which
may not exist permanently, and the existing carry-over of large
IsLouis H. Hacker, Holding the Feed Bag, The New Freeman (Aug.
27, 1930), Vol. I, p. 62.
"I bid. World Trade Barriers in Relation to Agriculture, Senate
Document No. 70 (1933), World Agriculture, An International Survey,
Royal Institute of International Affairs (1932).
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stocks, considerably greater reductions are necessary to give
immediate relief than will be necessary as a permanent policy. 15
The methods for restricting production which are embodied
in the Agricultural Adjustment. Act and supplementary legislation include both coercive and non-coercive measures. It "will
not be attempted within the scope of this paper to discuss the
particular provisions of all of the restrictive measures as they
apply to individual crops. And no attempt will be made to
forsee and discuss all of the problems which -will arise in relation to any one of them. The purpose of this essay will be to
deal with some of the more important legal problems that are
suggested by the various methods of control, to examine the
legal basis for the exertion of Federal power over production,
and to make suggestions, when any occur to the writer, how certain legal difficulties nay be avoided.
Assuming that oontrol of production in some manner is to
be attempted, the question immediately arises whether and
how this can be accomplished under our constitutional system
of government. The chief sources from which congress may
possibly derive the necessary power are the following:
(1) Spending and Taxing Power, (2) Power to Regulate Interstate Commerce, (3) Treaty Making Power, (4) Power over
Money and Credit including BMnkruptcy.
CONTROL

OF

PRODUCTION UNDER THE TAXING AND
SPENDING PowER

The first method which suggests itself under the Taxing
and Spending Power is to secure voluntary reduction of acreage or production by means of financial inducements to the
farmers. This is the method suggested by the Voluntary
Domestic Allotment Plan and is the means adopted in the. Agricultural Adjustment Act. It is not my purpose to discuss the
15It has been suggested that "The more permanent policy should
be directed toward inducing farmers to cultivate more of the poorer
acres extensively and to use more intensive methods on their better
lands." Black, Agricultural Reform in the United States, Land Utilization, p. 295 (1929). Purchase of sub-marginal lands by the government

and a gradual absorption of many who are now engaged in agriculture

by Industry is probably the most practical means of handling the long
time problem. Report of Secretary of Agriculture, 1923; Report of the
Agricultural Adjustment Administration, 1933-34, Planning for the
Future, p. 271.
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merits of this method as an effective means of securing the
control desired but rather to examine its legal validity. As the
A. A. A. 16 embodies this method of control, it may be utilized as
a convenient point of departure from which to examine the
legal problems involved. One of the first problems that presents itself is whether Congress may constitutionally make an
appropriation or levy a tax to be used for making payments to
farmers for acreage or production reduction. Since Congress
may appropriate money for such purposes as it may raise
money by taxation, the power to appropriate being an implied
power, the question as to legality of purpose for which a tax
may be levied or an appropriation iuade would seem to be the
same. There is, however, one important respect in which the
tax and the appropriation must be considered separately. That
is the problem of raising the constitutional question in a manner to present a justiciable issue to the court. In the case of a
tax, there is no difficulty in raising a justiciable issue.' 7 But
when an appropriation is made out of the general funds of the
treasury the difficulty of raising a justiciable issue as to the
congressional authority may be very great. This was the problem presented in Massachusetts v. Mellon' s in which the validity
of the Shepard-Towner act 1 9 was questioned. Massachusetts,
not having accepted the Federal grant, brought suit to enjoin
the pay~nent of money to those states that had. A citizen taxpayer of Massachusetts and of the United States also brought
suit. The court held that neither the State nor a citizen taxpayer had any standing in court to question the validity of an
appropriation made by Congress. As a result of this decision,
it seems difficult to get a judicial review of the spending power
of Congress. It is possible that the problem could be raised by
" Agricultural Adjustment Act, Public No. 10, 73d Congress (H. R.
3835).
17 0. P. Field, Recovery of Illegal and Unconstitutional Taxes, 45
H. L. R. 50 (1932). See Breck P. McAllister, Public Purpose in Taxation. 12 Calif. L. Rev. 137, 139 (1922-23); Lewinson, Restraining the Assessment or Collection of a Federal Tax, 14 Calif. L. Rev. 46 (1926);
Note, Who May Test the Constitutionality of a Statute, 47 H. L. Rev.
-677 (Feb., 1934).
1262 U. S. 447 (1923).

' 42 Stat. at L., c. 135, p. 224. This statute provided for an appropriation of money to be distributed among such states as accepted
the grant by matching the Federal funds for the purpose of promoting
the welfare and hygiene of infancy and maternity and other purposes.
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a person who was entitled to a payment under the terms of the
act if the disbursing officer refused to r ake payment on the
ground that the appropriation was void because unconstitutional.20 The possibility that the question will be raised in this
manner seems, however, to be rather remote. It would not seem
that the issue, if so raised, could be avoided by holding the payment to be due as a debt resulting from a moral obligation as
was held in the Sugar Bounty Cases 21 for those cases turned on
the fact that Congress passed an act specifically authorizing the
-payment of bounties to farmers who, in reliance on a prior
statute which had been repealed, had produced sugar with the
expectation of receiving a bounty.2 2 The court held that even
if the bounty statute were unconstitutional, a question which
the court reserved, it nevertheless created a moral obligation
which Congress could recognize as a debt and provide payment
therefor under its power to pay the debts of the United
States. 23 To make the case of a farmer suing for a payment
to which he was entitled parallel to the Sugar Bounty Cases,
Congress would have to pass an act authorizing payments of
24
existing claims.
The Agricultural Adjustment Act 25 may have, inadvertently, created another means of raising a justiciable issue in
regard to the constitutionality of an appropriation by Congress
although, apparently, the act was artfully drawn with the intention of avoiding the constitutional issue, for it provides that
the rental and benefit payments shall be paid "out of any
moneys available for such payments". 26 See. 12 (a) makes a
"See Intercontinental Rubber Co. v. Ferguson, Collector of the
United States (Dist. Ct. (1926), V-2 C. B. 104); United States v. Realty
Co.; United States v. Gay, 163 U. S. 427 (1896); see Yote, Who May
Test the Constitutionality of a Statute, 47 H. L. Rev. 677 (Feb., 1934):
It is usually held that a State Treasurer may question the constitutionality of a statute under which payment is to be made. See Public
Officers' Right to Question the Constitutionality of a State in Mandamus
Proceedings, Note, 42 H. L. R. 1071, cases cited at 1072, footnote 5.
1
2 United States Realty Co., U. S. v. Gay, Ibid.
"Cf.

Kingman Brewster, Is the Process Tax Constitutional?

19

A. B. A. 420 (July, 1933).
"Art. I, Sec. VIII, U. S. Const.
"A more likely ground of avoiding the issue would be to hold that
the disbursing officer had not a sufficient interest to raise the question.
See Note, Who May Test the Constitutionality of a Statute, 47 H. L. R.
677 (Feb., 1934).
1Supra, n. 3.
2 Sec. 8, subsec. (1).
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general appropriation to be used for administrative expenses
and for rental and benefit payments. In addition the National
Recovery Act authorizes the President to allocate a part of the
appropriation authorized by the act for the expenditures which
he deems necessary in carrying out the Agricultural Adjustment Act. 27 The Agricultural Adjustment Act also contains
an express provision that if any provision is declared unconstitritional as to any person, circumstance, or commodity, the remainder of the act shall not be affected -thereby.28 So far so
good. If the Act stopped here the difficulty of raising the constitutional issue would be that of questioning the validity of a
general appropriation. Let us now turn to the processing tax.
"See. 9. (a) To obtain revenue for extraordinary expenses incurred by reason of the national economic emergency, there
shall be levied processing taxes as hereinafter provided.. When
the ecretary of Agriculture determines that rental or benefit
payments are to be made with respect to any basic agricultural
commodity, he shall proclaim such determination, and a processing tax shall be in effect with respect to such commodity from
the beginning of the marketing year therefor next following
the date of such proclamation. . . ." (Italics the writer's.)
Thus, while the act attempts to make the processing tax
purely a revenue measure which as such could not be questioned, it does not succeed in separating the tax entirely from
the rental or benefit payments, for the tax is not to go into
effect on any commodity until the Secretary of Agriculture decides to make rental or benefit payments in connection with that
commodity. See. 12 (b) appropriates the money from, such
taxes to be used partially for the purpose of making rental and
benefit payments. Hence it would seem that the processing
taxes are inextricably tied up with the-provision for making
rental and benefit payments and the two must stand or fall
together. 29 It would seem, therefore, that a person who was
w N. R. A. Public No. 67; 73rd Congress, Sec. 220.
A. A. A., Sec. 14.
h8
2 On inseparability of provisions see, Note, 40 H. L. R. 676;
Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U. S. 235 (1928); Kingman Brewster of the Washington, D. C., Bar believes that the whole Act, with
the possible exception of Titles II and -III which deal with agricultural
credits and inflation must fall if the Process Tax falls. See his article,
"Is the Process Tax Constitutional?" 19 A. B. A. 419 (1933). Comllare
Charles N. Goodwin, The Processing Taxes, 11 Tax Magazine 330
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assessed with a processing tax could raise the question of the
validity of the rental and benefit payments because if they are
unconstitutional the tax, being dependent upon such payments
for its levy, could not constitutionally be assessed. 30 Obviously,
the purpose of the process tax is to enable the Secretary to
carry out the program of ieduction as its levy is specifically
dependent thereon, and if that fails the purpose of the tax is
eliminated.
Assuming that the issue has been properly raised, the next
question that arises in relation to the validity of a tax for the
purpose of controlling agricultural production is the scope of
the congressional power to tax. The Constitution of the United
States provides :31
"The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties,
imposts, and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States; but all duties, imposts,
and excises shall be uniform throughout the- United States."

The Congress nay, it appears, levy taxes for three purposes,3 2 (1) to pay the debts, (2) to provide for the common
defense, and (3) to provide for the generaZ welfare of the
United States. The first two purposes are obviously inapplicable. This brings us to the question of whether a tax or an
appropriation of money for the purpose of controlling agricultural production comes within the power to levy a tax for
the "general welfare". This, in turn, leads to another question which must be settled before answering the first. XVho
shall determine what is for the general welfare? Since the
power to levy a tax for the general welfare is entrusted to
Congress it naturally follows that Congress must determine
what the "general welfare" consists of, at least, in the first
(Sept., 1933). Mr. Goodwin believes that while the Process Tax is dependent upon the validity of the rental and benefit payments, the
latter is not necessarily dependent upon the validity of the Process
Tax. I believe the legal problem regarding the validity of the rental
and benefit payments and the Process Tax is the same outside of the
question of raising the issue.
"OEnployers Liability Cases, 207 U. S. 463 (1908); New York
CentralR?. R. Co. v. White, 243 U. S. 188 (1917); Cf. Jeffery Mfg. Co. v.
.Blagg, 235 U. S. 571 (1915).
3 Art. I, See. VIIL
3 That these are the purposes for which the tax may be laid rather
than an additional grant of power, see Edwin S. Corwin, The Spending Power of Congress-Apropos the Maternity Act, 36 H. L. Rev. 548,
551 (1922-28).

K. L . J.-6
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instance, else Congress could not exercise its power. One eminent authority on Constitutional questions, having made a critical study of "The Spending Power of Congress", 33 says:
"We must conclude that into the 'dread field' of money
expenditure the court may not 'thrust its sickle'; that so far
as this power goes, the 'general welfare' is what Congress finds
it to be."
It does not follow, however, that Congress is subject to no
control whatsoever in the exercise of its taxing power. The
very nature of the taxing power requires that it be exercised
only for a public purpose else it is not a tax but only a legislative fiat. And though the court will resolve every doubt in
favor of its validity, it is ultimately a question for the court to
determine what constitutes a public purpose. 34 All of the cases
that have dealt with what constitutes a public purpose for which
taxation can be sustained have related to State taxation. Among
the earliest of"the cases arising in the Federal Courts are Railroad Co. v. Otoe,3 5 and Olcott v. The Suipervisors,36 both of
which dealt with the legality of a tax to aid privately owned
railroad corporations. The Federal Court had original jurisdiction in both instances and no Federal question was involved.
In Railroad Co. v. Otoe, the language of the court -was such as
to indicate that since there' was no express constitutional limitation the exercise of the spending and taxing power was completely within the discretion of the state legislature.
"No one questions," said the Court, "that in the absence
of some constitutional inhibition the power of a state to appropriate money, however raised, is limited only by the sense of justice and by the sound discretion of the legislature. If the power
to tax be unrestricted, the power to appropriate the taxes is
necessarily equally so. Accordingly nothinghas been more common in the State and Federal governments than to appropriate
money .raised by taxation to objects in regard to which no legal
"Edwin S. Corwin, 36 H. L. R. 548 at 580 (1922-23).
" FalZbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U. S. 112 (1896); Loan
Assoc. v. Topeka, supra, n. 33. On the general topic see F. N. Judson,
Public Purpose for which Taxation is Justifiable, 17 Y. L. J. 162 (1917);
Breck P. McAllister, Public Purpose in Taxation, 18 Calif. L. Rev. 137
(1930); Note, 41 H. L. R. 775 (1928); State Taxation for Relief of
Group Distress, 41 Y. L. J. 779 (1932).
16 Wall. 667 (1872).
16 Wall. 678 (1872).
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liability has existed. State legislatures have made donations for
numerous purposes, wherever in their judgment, the public well
being required them, and the right to make such gifts has never

been seriously questioned.'

7

..

"It was for the legislature to determine whether the object
to be aided was one in which the people of the State had an in-

terest. "38
In Olcott v. The Supervisors3 9 much the same question was
involved. But there was an additional complication. In a case
involving exactly the same question, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin had held that taxation for the aid of a privately owned
railroad was not for a public purpose and that the bonds given
to the railroad company were void. 40 Since no Federal question
such as the impairment of contracts was raised, the case seemed
clearly to be one for the application of State law. The Federal
Court refused to be bound by the decision of the Wisconsin
court and upheld the authority of the legislature to grant aid to
privately owned railroad corporations. It evaded the Wisconsin
decision by holding that what constitutes "public purpose" is a
question of general law. Said the Court:
"Now, whether a use is public or private Is not a question of constitutional construction. It is a question of general law. ..
"The nature of taxation, what uses are public and what are private,
and the extent of unrestricted legislative power, are matters which,
like questions 5f commercial law, no state court can conclusively determine for us."

This decision would seem to indicate that the Federal decisions on public purpose in State taxation would also serve as
precedents in cases involving Federal taxation if the latter came
before the court. And it would seem, if the State legislatures are
limited to taxation for public purposes only, that Congress,
which has no powers other than those expressly granted to it by
the Constitution, would be similarly limited. If the very definition of a tax implies that the money can be used only for a
public purpose it seems clear that the delegation of the power to
tax is a delegation of a power to collect money only for a public
purpose.
"Railroad v. Otoe, supra, n. 35 at 675.
18 1d., at 676.
S16 Wall. 676 (1872).

"0Whiting v. Fond du Lac Co., 25 Wis. 167 (1870).

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

The Federal Courts have not thought it necessary to rely
upon any particular provision of the State constitutions in order
to determine the validity of a particular tax. All that has been
necessary is a finding by the court that the tax was not levied for
a public purpose. 41 This position seems unsound in principle as
applied to the legislatures of the States since they are said tohave all power not prohibited to them by the State or Federal
Col3stitutions. 42 But, as the Federal Government has only those
powers delegated to it, a Federal exaction which is not for a
public purpose and therefore not a tax at all would appear to
violate the Tenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
However, there is another basis for the Court's jurisdiction over
Congress in this matter.
In Fallbrook IrrigationDistrict v. Bradley,4 3 a case arose
involving the question whether a special assessment tax for the
purpose of irrigating arid lands was for a public purpose. "Due
to a State constitutional amendment declariiig the use of water
for irrigation-to be a public use and because of several decisions
by the Supreme Court of California upholding the act as to
State law it became necessary to raise a Federal question in
order to get the question reviewed by the Federal Courts. The
court assumed jurisdiction on the ground that if the tax was not
for a public purpose it would be a violation of the "due process"
clause of the 14th amendment to the Federal Constitution. In
view of this holding it would seem possible to question the purpose of Federal taxes under the Fifth Amendment, 44 since the
restraint imposed upon legislation by the due process clause of
the two amendments is the same. 45
4 In Cole v. La Grange, 113 U. S. 1 (1885), the federal court had
original jurisdiction. The lower court held that bonds dedicated to a
steel manufactory were void on two grounds, (1) that it violated the
Missouri Constitution, (2) that the tax was not levied for a public
purpose. On appeal the Supreme Court affirined the decision on the
latter ground and expressly avoided an interpretation of the Missouri
Constitution though the case involved the application of state law.
For a similar holding see Loan Assoc. v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 665 (U. S.,

1874).
harpless v. Philadelphia,21 Pa. 147, 59 Am. Dec. 759 (1853).
Supra, note 34.
"Heiner v. Donnon, 285 U. S. 312 (1932); Nichols v. Coolidge, 274
U. S. 531, 542 (1927). Cf. Brushaber v. Union Pac. R1. R. Co., 240 U. S.
1 (1916).
16Hurtado v. California,110 U. S. 516, 535 (1884) ; Coolidge v. Long,
282 U. S. 582, 596 (1930); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 1, 11 (1915).
4
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Passing then, from the problems involved in raising the
issue, to the broader constitutional aspects, is an appropriation
or tax to be used in controlling agricultural production to be condemned as a use of public revenue and the taxing power for private purposes? Perhaps the first step should be to ascertain
from a proper perspective just.what the purpose of controlling
production is. With this in view let us examine the pertinent
provisions of the A. A. A. The act is entitled:
"An act

. . . To relieve the existing national

economic

emergency by increasing agricultural purchasing power, to raise revenue for extraordinary expenses incurred by reason of such emergency,
to provide emergency relief with respect to agricultural indebtedness,
to provide for orderly liquidation of joint stock land banks, and for
other purposes."
The declaration of emergency and the declaration of policy
in Title I of the Act further indicate that the purpose of the
Act is not limited to giving aid to the individual farmers who
receive rental or benefit payments. The theory of the Act is
that general prosperity will be aided by restoring purchasing
power to the farmers, so that farmers will be able to buy industrial products. This purchasing power is to be restored by bringing production and consumption into such balance as will enable
farmers to realize a fair equivalent in exchange for their products. It is thought that both Industry and Agriculture will
be aided by the establishment of a fair exchange value for agricultural commodities. 46 Whether or not the Act will accomplish
its purpose is not a legal problem. 47 The legal problem is to
ascertain the purpose of the Act and determine whether that
purpose is public or private. It is a very diffiult matter to
draw the line between what constitutes a public and what constitutes a private purpose. If possible the Act must be so construed as to make the purpose public since a construction which
will make the Act constitutional is preferred to one that will
make it invalid. Hence, the legislation should not be dissected
See Note, 29 Col. L. Rev. 624 (1929), for a discussion of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments.
0 See Statement of Sec. Wallace, June 4, 1933, Prent. Hall. Fed.
Trade and Industry, Vol. 3, Sec. 40, 113; Hearings before Senate Committee on Agriculture, Mar. 17-28, 1933; "When producing concerns
fail

. .

. and communities dependent upon profitable production

are prostrated, the wells of commerce go dry." Hughes, J., Appalachian
Coals Co. v. United States, 288 U. S. 344, 372 (1932).
"1Nebbia v. People (U. S. Sup. Ct., Mar. 5, 1934); Green v. Frazier,
253 U. S. 233 (1920).
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and considered piecemeal in order to bring certain phases of the
Act within the ratio decedendi of selected constitutional precedents. It is believed that Mr. Kingman Brewster has fallen into
this error in his discussion of the constitutionality of the Process
Tax 4s After making the assumption that the whole Act will
fall4 9 if the processing tax is unconstitutional, Mr. Brewster then
isolates the tax for purposes of discussion. In dicussing the
question whether the tax is for a public purpose he ignores the
general purpose of the Act and assumes that the purpose of the
tax is to be found solely in the source of its expenditure. He
says:50 "The above adjudication (referring to Loan Assoeiation v. Topeka)51 naturally impels us to consider whether or not
the present law taxes for a public purpose, i. e., whether the
rental of lands and the distribution o.f benefits to the farmers
under the present emergency situation can be considered as a
public purpose. To say that it is not a tax until one can first
decide the nature of the relief given to farmers would seem to
5 2beg the question." He then adverts to the Sugar Bounty Cases
and ends up by asserting that the substance of the tax "is an
attempt to tax A for the benefit of B" and that "it is certainly
difficult to say that the purpose for which this tax is raised can
be designated as a public one."
This conclusion is obviously based upon the assumption that
the purpose of the tax is to pay a sort of bonus or benefit payment to the particular farmer who participates in the plan. It
wholly ignores the broader purpose of the Act considered as a
whole. It also ignores the fact that the farmer is not receiving
the money for nothing. Every farmer who receives money from
the government must agree to cooperate in the broader purposes
of the Act by reducing acreage or production. Thus these payments are not intended to benefit alone the particular farmer
who receives them. Indeed, it is questionable who the payments
will benefit more, those who do not limit their acreage or those
who receive the payments and limit their acreage. 53 But regardIsSupra, n. 29.

4OHe indicates a possible exception of Titles II and III which re-

late to credits and inflation. Supra, n. 29 at p. 419.
0 Supra, n. 29 at 420.

20 Wall. 655 (1874).
-163 U. S. 427 (1896).
63 Incidence of Processing Taxes, Report of A. A. A. for 1933-34,

p.219 et seq.
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less of the actual effect, it is clear that the purpose is to raise the
general level of prices on those commodities taxed by controlling
their production, thus adding to the purchasing p-ower of all
5
who have such commodities for sale. 4
Mr. Brewster's statement that the tax is a tax on A for the
benefit of B has no more validity than a statement that every
tax when collected and spent by the government is spent for the
purpose of benefiting the person who sold goods or services to
the government rather than for the general purpose for which
the goods or services were purchased. To illustrate, take a tax
which is expended for educational purposes. Assume that the
money is actually expended for teachers' salaries, janitors' services and supplies. No one would maintain that the purpose
of the tax was to benefit teachers, janitors and supply merchants
nor that the general purpose was in any way affected by the fact
that the money was so expended. So it is with the payments of
rentals and benefits to the farmers. In each instance the money
is paid out to those who bind themselves to carry out the general
purpose for which the tax is levied, in the one case education, in
the other controlled production.
It is not material who receives the money so long as it is
spent for a public purpose. It may be material, however, whether
the persons who receive the money are legally bound to act in
accordance with the general purpose of the act. If the act
merely provides a donation to a private individual or private
corporation with no assurance other than a mere hope that the
money will be used in furthering the public interest, it will be
considered that the purpose of the act is private.
Loan Association v. Topeka55 is the leading case on this
question. The case involved an outright donation by a municipality to a private corporation for the purpose of establishing
a privately owned bridge factory. No conditions were attached
to the grant which would insure the operation of the factory in
the interest of the public. 56 Mr. Justice Miller, who dissented
"Effects on Farm Buying Power, Id., p. 261 et seq.
20 Wall. 655 (U. S., 1874).
"The law requires that some standards be established by the legislature for the guidance of government administrative officers. It would
seem to follow a fortirori that the public moneys to be spent for the
welfare of the public cannot be intrusted to the complete discretion of
a private agency or individual.
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in the cases upholding grants to private railroad corporations,
stated th6 issue in the case thus:
S..we assume that unless the legislature of Kansas had the
right to authorize the towns and counties in that state to levy taxes
to be used in aid of manufacturing enterprises, conducted by private
individuals, or private corporations, for purposes of gain, the law is
void, and the bonds issued under it are also void.""
The court stressed the fact that if the legislature could
donate money to such an enterprise it could do so to any or all
enterprises, and that the benefits which might accrue to the public was only the incidental benefit that accrued from investment
of capital in any enterprise. 55 - There were no special facts or
circumstances that made the establishment of a bridge factory
a public need or necessity. 59 There was no public control or
regulations whatever that would insure the operation of the factory in the interest of the public. 60
The situation in the case of
Cole v. La Grange61 was the same.
Contrast this situation with the problems involved in controlling production of agricultural commodities. During the
war American agriculture and farm debts were greatly increased
under the double stimulation of price and patriotism. Our
foreign trade was greatly increased reaching a high point in
1919. Thereafter it gradually decreased until 1929 and then
sharply. Production continued to increase. The natural.result
of these factors was a piling up of surpluses which were forced
upon the home market with its resulting influence on price. By
early. 1933 farm commodities had only half of their pre-war
exchange value. Debts contracted at high rates of interest when
Supra, n. 37, at 670.

18It has been quite common in the past for communities to vie
with each other in attracting industries to locate therein. The most
common means has been by kranting tax exemptions. See Claude W.
Stimson, The Stimulation of Industry Through Tax Exemption, 11 Tax
Magazine, 169, 221 (May, 1933).

0 In FaZlbrook IrrigationDist. v. Bradley, supra, n. 34, at 159,o the

court said, "It is obvious, however, that what is a public use frequently
and largely depends upon the facts and circumstances surrounding the
particular subject matter in regard to which the character of the use
is questioned."

See Eakin v. South Dakota State Cement Comm., 44

So. Dak. 268, 183 N. W. 651 (1921), in which the court holds constitutional the support of a public cement plant.
OIn Olcott v. The Supervisors, 16 Wall. 678 (U. S., 1872), involv-

ing a donation to a private railroad corporation, the court was influenced by the fact that railroads, even though privately owned, were
subject to regulation by the government.
1113 U. S. 1 (1885).
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prices were high could not be paid. Bankruptcies and mortgage foreclosures reached a new high peak. The collapse of
farm prices caused a corresponding drop in farm valuations
wiping out the equities of a large number of formerly well-to-do
farmers and endangering, at the same time, the stability of many
of our financial institutions. The depressed exchange value of
agricultural commodities has largely if not totally cestroyed the
purchasing power of a large percentage of the farmers thus accentuating the decline in demand for industrial goods and serv02
ices.
Most of the important factors which have led to the serious
condition in which agriculture finds itself are national or international in character and are closely interwoven with general
economic conditions. Various factors have grown up as an aftermath of the war which have led to governmental intervention in
the conduct of international trade on a scale probably never
before equaled in modern times. Among the most important of
these factors are: the intense feeling of nationalism engendered
by the'war together with the complimentary goal of self-sufficiency; the division of European territory into several new countries; the changed status of the United States from a creditor to
a debtor nation, making it necessary for the debtor countries to
sell more than they buy; retaliation against the high American
tariffs; unstable currency and exchange fluctuations.0 3 All of
these factors have grown out of national or international relationships and can obviously be attacked only on a national or
international scale.
The need for a national policy in relation to American agriculture is clearly recognized by the leading economists who have
dealt with the problem. 64 Secretary Wallace has recently presented the various alternatives from which America must make
,"For a short but comprehensive presentation of the agricultural
situation, see the Report of the Secretary of Agriculture (Nov. 15,
1933); see also, Slichter, Modern Economic Society (1933), at p. 114,
where the author points out some of the far-reaching effects of a loss
of purchasing power by any. important group.
"World Trade Barriers in Relation to Agriculture, Senate Document No. 70 (1933); World Agriculture, an International Survey.
Royal Institute of International Affairs (1932).
OBee Duddy, Economic Policy for American Agriculture (Sept.,
1931), for a collection of reports by several leading agricultural economists; J. D. Black, Agricultural Reform in the U. S. (1929); Seligman, Economics of Farm Relief (1929).
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its choice in dealing with the agricultural situation. 65 The
remedy must lie along one of three lines: an extension of the
foreign markets to a very marked degree entailing a willingness
to accept a greatly increased amount of foreign products, selfcontainment with a resulting lower standard of living, or a
planned middle course somewhere between the two first mentioned. And Whichever path is pursued will require national action.
The problem of surpluses is intimately tied up with the national
policy in relation to such things as tariffs, transportation, money,
and credit, national defense, insular possessions, and taxation
that any individual attempts to deal with the situation is doomed
in advance to failure. How then can it possibly be said that
taxation for the purpose of dealing with this situation is a tax
levied for a private purpose? MWhat is the basis of distinction
on which the court must rely?
In Loan Association v. Topeka, the Court said :66
"And in deciding whether, in the given case, the object for which
the taxes are assessed falls upon one side or the other of this line,
they must be governed mainly by the course and usage of the government, the objects for which taxes have been customarily and by long
course of legislation levied, what objects or purposes have been considered necessary to the support and for the proper use of the government, whether state or municipal. Whatever lawfully pertains to
this and is sanctioned by time and the acquiescence of the people may
well be held to belong to the public use, and proper for the maintenance of good government, though this may not be the only criterion
of rightful taxation." (Italics are thle writer's.)

Taxes have been customarily and by long course of legislation levied by Congress for the advancement of the economic
welfare of the people of the United States. One has only to
mention the activities of the Department of Congress both at
home and abroad. 'Dollar diplomacy' and the expenditures it
has entailed are a commonplace in American political history.
Then there is the protective tariff which has been called to the
aid of almost every economic group within the United States
and which has been specifically upheld by the Supreme Court. 67
But we need not go beyond the expenditures which have been
14Henry A. Wallace, America Must Choose, World Affairs, Pamphlet, No. 8 (1934).
"20 Wall. 665 (1874).
61Hampton and Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394 (1928). Even if
the protective tariff could be sustained as a regulation of foreign commerce, it would hardly be maintained that it could be levied for a
private purpose. It is therefore available as an illustration of public
purpose.
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made for the promotion of Agriculture. The extensive ramifications of the Department of Agriculture are well known. It has
been said that America does more for the promotion of its agriculture than any other country in the world. 68 Dissemination
of information, collection of farm statistics, control of plant and
animal diseases, scientific experimentation, drainage, irrigation,
control of soil erosion, stabilization of the markets, encouragemLent of farmers' cooperatives, land banks and loans to farmers
are among the many activities in which the government has engaged and the people have sanctioned by time and acquiescence.
We have seen that the only cases in which a tax has been
held to be for a private purpose involved an outright donation to
private corporations. Let us now examine some of the decisions
in which the purpose has been questioned and held to be public.
The cases involving aid to the railroads have already been mentioned. In Railroad Company v. Otoe69 it was held to be a publie purpose for a county to donate money to a railroad for the
purpose of securing a connection with the eastern markets. Is
it not equally a public purpose to stimulate trade with the various markets which the transportaiion facilities exist to serve?
In Fallbrook IrrigationDistrict v. Bradley!0 the validity of
a California statute which provided for the establishment of
irrigation districts to be paid for by a special assessment against
the land was questioned in the Federal courts. After deciding
that the Fourteenth Amendment gave the Court jurisdiction to
determine whether the tax was a taking of property without due
process of law, the Court sustained the tax holding it was for a
public purpose. In this case we have a clean cut decision in
which it is held that the promotion of the material prosperity of
a community by the improvement of agricultural land is a publie purpose. The Court was strongly influenced by the fact that
the undertaking was one that could not be advantageously undertaken without the cooperation of the whole group. It said:
"The use must be regarded as a public use, or else it would seem
to follow that no general scheme of irrigation can be formed or
carried int6 effect. . . .
"While the consideration that the work of irrigation must be
abandoned if the use of the water may not be held to constitute a
Op. cit., n. 10.
Supra, n. 35.
Sfupra, n. 34.
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public use is not to be regarded as conclusive in favor of such use,
yet that fact in this case is a most important consideration.",%

The necessity for cooperation as a prerequisite to control of
agricultural production and the lack of any practical or effective
method of securing it without governmental action seems equally
obvious ana fully as important a consideration as in irrigation.
This case, it is true, is not a case of general taxation but
one of special assessment. But a special assessment is merely
an exercise of the taxing power with the burden apportioned
among those most benefited. And the decision of the Court is
broad enough to have sustained a general tax. A person cannot
72
be taxed even by special assessment purely for his own benefit.
But the Court held that the interest of the general public was
also served. It said:
"To irrigate and thus to bring into possible cultivation these large
masses of otherwise worthless lands would seem to be a public purpose and a matter of public interest, not confined to the landowners,
or even to any one section of the state. The fact that the use of the
water is limited to the landowner is not therefore a fatal objection to
this legislation. It is not essential that the entire community or even
participate in an
any considerable part of it should directly enjoy ' or
improvement in order to constitute a public use." '

Here it was obvious that the direct benefits would go primarily to one class, so obvious that that class was specially taxed for
the improvement, yet the purpose was held to be public. The
mere possibility that the farmers may benefit more than others
from controlled production is not, then, a valid reason for holding that the purpose is a private one. 74 When concerted action
is necessary to insure the material prosperity of a cominunity
as a class, individual rights must yield or be modified by the
rights of others for the public benefit3 5 And the increase of the
beneficial use of land is a public purpose when concerted action
is necessary to attain itJ 6 The value of agricultural land, in an
Supra, n. 34, at 160, 161.
Macon v. Patty, 57 Miss. 378, at 397 (1879). ". . . power does
not exist in a constitutional government to cbmpel a person to improve his estate for his own private benefit:' St. Paul Trust and Savings Bank v. American Clearing Co., 291 Fed. 212 (1923).
Supra, n. 34, at 161.
14
Schaff v. go. Dak. Rural Credits Board, 39 So. Dak. 377, 387,
164 N. W. 964 (1917).
15/Supra, n. 34, at 163; Head v. Ameskeag Mfg. Co., 113 U. S. 9
(1885).
16
Supra, n. 34, at 167, 168. "If land which can, to a certain extent,
be beneficially used without artificial irrigation, may yet be so much
71

72
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unsocialized state, is determined by the exchange value of its
products. The theory of controlled production is that by balancing production with consumption the exchange value of agricultural commodities will rise ;77 the effect of such a rise would be
an increase in the beneficial use of the land.
Another class of cases involving the question of taxation for
a public purpose are those in which the State directly engages in
business. It is too well settled to be questioned that the State
may enter into business activities which are not governmental in
character.78 But it cannot support a business by taxation unless
the business is one which serves a public purpose. There is no
instance in which the Supreme Court has held a business engaged in by the State to be unauthorized because for a private
purpose. It appears that the courts are much more liberal in
allowing a State or its subdivisions to engage in a business itself
than to donate aid to a private individual or a corporation with
the possible exception of grants to privately owned railroads.79
If this be true then the nature of the business cannot be the only
important factor. If a business which is operated under private
ownership is not such as can be aided by taxation, but may
become so when operated by the State, then it follows that how
the business is operated, i. e., privately or by the public, may be
equally as important as what kind of business it is. If the activity is one which is regulated in the public interest either
because it is "affected witlh a public interest" 8 0 or because the
improved by it that it will be thereby and for its original use substantially benefited, and in addition to its former use though not in
exclusioii of it, if it can be put to other and more remunerative uses,
we think It erroneous to say that the furnishing of artificial irrigation to that kind of land cannot be, in a legal sense, a public improvement, or the use of the water a public use."
I "Under existing economic arrangements, most enterprises must
normally restrict output in order to maintain solvency."

Slichter,

Modern Economic Society (1932), p. 5; see Edwin G. Nourse, Can
Agriculture Affect Prices by Controlling Production? Proceedings of
Academy of Pl. Sci., Vol. X-, p. 523 (1932).
,8 South Carolinav. U. S., 199 U. S. 437 (1905); Standard Oil Co. v.
City of Lincoln, 114 Neb. 243 (1926); affirmed 275 U. S. 504 (1927);
Green v. Franzier,253 U. S. 233 (1920).
"This can probably be explained by the fact that transportation
has long been considered a public service, and also by the fact that it
is a public utility subject to regulation.
1 It seems not unlikely that grants to Railroad Companies would
have been held invalid had they not been subject to regulation. Cf.
Whiting v. Pond du Lao Co., 25 Wis. 167 (1870), with Olcott v. The
Supervisors, 16 Wall. 678 (1872); Gelpecke v. City of Dubuque, 1 Wall.
175 (1846).
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State directly controls it through ownership and operation,8 1 it
is not likely that the Supreme Court will deny the right to support such activity by taxation on the ground that it is not a public enterprise.8 2 In such cases the expenditure of public moneys
is not entrusted to the hands of private individuals who are
neither officers of the state nor subject to state control. One of
the points stressed by the Court in Loan Association v. Topeka 3
was the fact that the money was turned into private hands with
no assurance that the factory would be operated for the welfare
of the community. This objection cannot be raised to the expenditure of Federal funds for agricultural control. The money
is expended by the government officials for a definitely specified
quid pro quo, the reduction of acreage or production in stipulated amounts.
In Green v. Frazier8 4 the Supreme Court, in sustaining legislation which provided that the State would engage in the manufacturing and marketing of farm products, provide homes for
the people, and appropriate money and create a state banking
company to carry the scheme into effect, adopted the following
5
language from Justice Cooley.8
"Necessity alone is not the test by which the limits of state authority in this direction are to be defined, but a wise statesmanship must
look beyond the expenditures which are absolutely needful to the continued existence of organized government, and embrdce others which
may tend to make that government subserve the well being of society,
and advance the prospective happiness and prosperity of the people.'"

In view of the paternalistic history of our Federal Government, the purposes for which it was founded, and the "general
welfare" clause of the taxing power of Congress, this broad
language seems equally applicable to the Federal Government.

11
Under the rule of Loan Assoc. v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 665 (1874), a
donation to a private company could not be sustained. And a state
cannot regulate the prices of gasoline of privately owned companies
because the business is not "affected with a public interest." Williams
v. Standard Oil, 275 U. S. 235 (1927). But a municipality may engage
in the business of operating a gasoline filling station. Standard Oil
Co. v. City of Lincoln, 114 Neb. 243 (1926); affirmed 275 U. S. 504
(1927). See also Eakin v. So. Dak. State Cement Comm., 44 So. Dak.
268, 183 N. W. 651 (1921), where it is held permissible for tle state
to operate a public cement plant.
Si Standard Oil Co. v. City of
idncoln, ibid., in which the court
affirmed the decision of the Sup. Ct. of Neb. in a memorandum opinion.
2 0 Wall. 655 (1874).
253 U. S. 233 (1920).
w,20 Mich. 452 (1870).
8Green v.Frazier, supra, n.78, at 240.
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But it is not for the court to decide whether such legislation is
87

wise.

That is the problem of the legislative body. The problem of
the court is merely to determine whether the legislative body has
exceeded its constitutional powers. It is therefore submitted
that the Court will have no difficulty in supporting such legislation as a proper exercise of the taxing power from the standpoint of public purpose.
Another ground which has been suggested for holding such
legislation unconstitutional is that it is really price-fixing under
the guise of taxation and as such interferes with the reserved
powers of the states.8 8 It must be admitted that legislation
which is designated to effect controlled production is intended
to affect prices. But it does not follow from the fact that the
states may, within the scope of their police power, 9 enact legislation which affects, regulates, or even fixes prices of services or
commodities that affect the public interest that such power is
reserved exclusively to the states.9 0 *While Congress may not
violate the Tenth Amendment by exercising powers it does not
have, 91 the Tenth Amendment affords no criterion as to what
powers Congress does have. This can be determined only by reference to and interpretation of the powers delegated to Congress
by the Constitution for within the sphere of its delegated powers the Federal Government is supreme.
The question then is whether the power to tax which has
been delegated to Congress includes the power to raise money
to be used in controlling production when it is intended thereby
to affect prices. If it does there is no interference with the reserved powers of the states, and if it does not, there is. The con"With the wisdom of such legislation, and the soundness of the
economic policy involved we are not concerned. Whether it will result in ultimate good or harm is not within our province to inquire."
Id., at p. 240; Nebbia v. People (U. S. Sup. Ct., Mar. 5, 1934).
SKlngman Brewster, Is the Process Tax Constitutional? 19
A. B. A. 419, 421 (July, 1933); Senator Reed of Penn., Ibid., 419, Congr.
Record, Vol. 77, pp. 1632-35.
8 That such regulation is an exercise of the police power, see Munn
v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113 (1876); Nebbia v. People (U. S. Sup. Ct., Mar.
5, 1934).
9'Nor is it sufficient to invalidate the taxing authority given to
Congress by the Constitution that the same business may be regulated
by the police power of the state. Lambert v. Ye~lowley, 272 U. S. 581,
596 (1926); U. H. v. Doremus, 249 U. S. 86 (1919).
1 Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U. S. 20 (1922); Hill v. Wallace, 259
U. S.44 (1922).
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tention that to so use the power to tax is a perversion of the taxing power for private purposes has already been disposed of.
The only remaining question is whether the power to tax, a
revenue raising power, is being perverted into a regulatory
power, not within the powers delegated to Congress by the Federal Constitution. Or more pointedly, is a Federal tax measure
which is patently intended to affect production and prices void
because of such intent?
The answer to this question should not be made without
considering the nature of the taxing power and the broad discretion which rests with the legislature in exercising it. Since the
very nature of a tax implies that it is a revenue raising power, it
might have been held, as it was in the regulation of public utilities, that a tax could ujot be confiscatory. It is, however, well
settled that a Federal tax which is otherwise valid will not be
92
voided by the Court on the sole ground that it is excessive.
Neither will the Court inquire into the motives of Congress.
In MoCray v. United States9" the Court was confronted with a
tax which was clearly discriminatory as between colored and
uncolored oleomargarine and was so excessive as to have the
practical effect of excluding the colored product from the market, a result that Congress had no power to effect directly.94 But the Court held that the discretion of Congress to
levy excise taxes could not be controlled and that "a motive disclosed in its selection to discourage sale or manufacture of an
article by a higher tax than on some other did not invalidate the
tax." 95 The principle that the Court will not void a tax merely
because it is excessive or prompted by an improper motive when
otherwise valid together with the power to select and classify the
subjects of taxation afford a powerful means of directing policy
by taxation in those situations where, by accident, the course of
conduct which it is desired to discourage coincides with -what the
court considers a proper basis of selection and classification for
12 Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533 (U. S., 1869); McCray v.
United States, 195 U. S. 27 (1904). The court was probably influenced
by the apparent impossibility of devising any judicial method of determining
whether a particular tax is or is not excessive.
93
Ibid.

14In Veazie Bank v. Fenno, supra, n. 92, at 549, it appears that
Congress had the power to accomplish by direct means what it effbcted
by means of a drastic tax.
0 Per Ch. J. Taft in the Child Labor Tax Case, supra, n. 91, at p. 42,
discussing the MeCray case.
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the purpose of taxation, or where by design the legislature seeks
to discourage only so much of undesirable conduct as it can
reach by this method. 96 Thus, while chain stores may be discouraged by progressive taxation according to the number in
the chain, it cannot be discouraged on the basis of how many
counties they are operated in. 97 But the act must not show on
its face that its main purpose is to prohibit or regulate conduct. 5 Therefore, any detailed legislation designed to effect regulation must bear a reasonable relation to the enforcement or
collection of the tax9 9 even though it is obvious that the tax is
prohibitory and hence no tax is expected to be collected.
In other words, if a measure is in form a tax it will not be invalidated because it is in effect a regulation of policy. This may
seem an unreasonable rule of law, but when it is remembered
that the choice of subject matter for every tax involves a choice
of policy between activities left untaxed and those taxed, and
the rate of every tax involves to some extent a choice of policy
between the activities taxed, and that both the choice of subject
matter and the rate of the tax involves a consideration of the
effect of the tax even when it is in fact levied for revenue only,
it may not seem unreasonable to leave to Congress the full control of all matters of policy which may be reached through the
device of taxation. It is not a sufficient reason to deny a power
because its exercise is subject to abuse.
But the court does not tolerate the regulation of policy
under guise of the taxing power when Congress attempts to regulate subjects of public interest over which it has no' direct control by setting up a standard of conduct and imposing a tax on
departures from it.00 "To give such magic to the word 'tax'
would be to break down all constitutional limitations of the powers of Congress and completely wipe out the sovereignty of the
states. '" 101 Under the rule of the McCray'0 2 case is appears that
Congress may require the "goose that lays the golden eggs" to
lay any number it desires even if the number required kills the
98See Flint v. Stone Tracy, 220 U. S. 107 (1910); Liggett v. Lee,
288 U. S. 517 (1933).
• Liggett v. Lee, ibid.
" Child Labor Tax, supra, n. 91; Hill v. Wallace, supra, n. 91.
" United States v. Doreinus, 249 U. S. 86 (1919).
2*Hill v. Wallace, supra, n. 91; Child Labor Tax Case, supra, n. 91.
"0 Per Ch. J. Taft in Child Labor Tax Case, upra, n. 91, at 38.

1*2
Supra, n. 92.

K. L. J.-7
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"goose". Under the Doremus 0 3 case Congress may direct the
goose when and where to lay the "eggs" so that they may be
easily collected even though this adds to the strain on the already
over-burdened "goose."
But under the Child Labor Tax
Case'0 4 and Hill v. Wallace,'05 Congress, who has a right only
to the "eggs," may not enforce other duties or contributions by
exempting the "goose" from the duty of laying the "eggs."
This doctrine is very analagous to the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. If Congress may destroy the "goose," it
might seem that it could spare its life on its own terms. But the
likelihood that Congress will abuse its power by imposing the
death penalty and thus lose the "golden eggs" is not great if it
has no power to grant a reprieve on conditions more to be desired than the "golden eggs."
What if, however, a tax law which is essentially a revenue
measure discloses the existence of an incidental motive not itself
within the jurisdiction of Congress? It has been held that this
does not invalidate the tax. 0 6 Does it make any difference that
the incidental motive relates to production or price? Before examining the cases on this point it might be pointed out that every
tax, regardless of motive, is likely to have some effect on production and prices, since it adds an additional item of cost. 1 °7 This
being so, it would seem that an intent to affect prices would be
less objectionable, not more so, than an intent to effect other
incidental consequences wholly unrelated to the exercise of the
taxing power but which can, nevertheless, be accomplished by
its exercise. .The cases support the view that a tax may be valid
though it intended, in addition .to being a revenue measure, to
affect prices. Under the Tariff Act of 1922, the President was
authorized to revise the tariff schedule by proclamation when
it was found that the duties fixed in the act did not equali2e the
cost of production at home and abroad. The defendant company
violated the changed schedule fixed under the authority of the
act and was prosecuted therefor. 08 One of the defenses urged
1 03

1

Supra, n. 90.

Supra, n. 91.

:11Supra, n. 91.
110United States v. Doremus, supra, n. 90; In Re Kollock, 165 U. S.

526 (1897); Mcray v. U. S., supra, n. 92; Hampton & Co. v. U. S., 276
UMS. 394 (1928); Quong Wing v. Kirkendall, 223 U. S. 59 (1912).
'10 Pacific American Fisheries v. Alaska, 269 U. S. 269, 277 (1925).
I-'sHampton & Co. v. U. S., 276, U. S. 194 (1928).
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was that the tax was invalid because its purpose was to protect
industry rather than to raise revenue. And though it was admitted that the tax rate was determined with reference to that
motive the Court upheld the tax saying:
"So long as the motive of Congress and the effect of its legislative
action are to secure revenue for the benefit of the general government,
the existence of other motives in the selection of the subjects of taxes
cannot invalidate congressional action

. . . And so here, the fact

that Congress declares that one of its motives in fixing the rates of
duty is to so fix them that they shall encourage the industries of this
country in the competition with producers in other countries in the
sale of goods
in this country, cannot invalidate a revenue act so
framed."' 19

In this case we have an express adjudication of the validity
of a tax imposed on one class for the benefit of another with the
express purpose of raising prices to a level that will protect and
encourage home industries. And the obvious purpose was to
raise prices by limiting the supply from abroad to that which
could be sold on the American market at a profit after having
incurred the additional cost of a tax, the rate of which is to be
determined with a view to protecting home industries. 110
In Alexander Theatre Ticket Office v. United Stdtes,111 a
tax which imposed a levy of five per cent on premiums up to
fifty cents on the resale price of theatre tickets 9nd a fifty per
cent tax on all premiums above fifty cents was held to be a valid
exercise of the taxing power. It will be noted that the Ticket
"" Ibid., at 412. Compare Champlain Refining Co. v. Corp. Comm.,
286 U. S. 210 (1932), where the court upheld an oil proration statute
on the ground that it prevented waste although it was undoubtedly
intended to raise prices as well.
no While the court clearly based its decision on the taxing power
the Hampton & Co. v. U. S., ibid., it has been suggested that it could
have been sustained as an exercise of the power to regulate foreign
commerce. Robert P. Reeder, 76 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 974-9, (1927-8). There
seems no more reason, however, for holding that the power to regulate commerce includes the power to affect prices intentionally than
does the taxing power. If the issue turned on a distinction between
a penalty and a tax it might be material if the exaction could be
supported even if a penalty under some other power. See Veazie Bank
v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533, 539 (U. S., 1869); Child Labor Tax Case, supra,
n. 91. But where, as here, the exaction was in the nature of a tax,
being a revenue raising measure and not a penalty to prohibit the importing of such articles, there was no reason to rely on the power to
regulate foreign commerce when the tariff could be upheld, as a proper
tax measure. And it does not necessarily follow that regulations which
would be valid under the commerce power can be sustained if secured
under the taxing power. Cf. Hill v. Wallace, supra, n. 91, with Board
of Trade of Chicago v. Olsen, 262 U. S.1 (1922).
2123 Fed. (2nd) 44 (1927).
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Company would make more profit under this tax by selling at
a premium of fifty cents at a five per cent tax than by selling at
a ninety per cent premium at a fifty per cent tax. The court
readily distinguished Tyson v. Banton, i i 2 involving a New York
statute which prohibited the sale of theatre tickets at a price
exceeding fifty cents above the box office price, on the ground
that the owner of the ticket was at liberty to fix the price at
which he would sell and the purchaser free to fix the price at
which he would buy. The fact that the tax was graduated in a
manner to affect the profits differently at different prices was
held not to invalidate the tax.
Taxation by the states for the support of public competition
with private enterprises for the purpose of securing cheaper
services has been sustained."13 Thus it appears that the incidental result of a revenue measure may be to affect prices with114
out interfering with the reserved powers of the States.
If, then, the Process Tax is invalid as an interference with
the reserved powers of the states, it is not so because it is a revenue measure which is incidentally intended to affect prices but
because it is in fact not a revenue measure at all but an outright
regulation of prices. This brings us to consider the nature of
the Process Tax and what it is intended to accomplish.
It seems very clear that the Process Tax is primarily a revenue measure. 115 It is intended to raise money and the act designates the manner in which it is to be spent. Obviously it is not a
penalty to discourage the processing of agricultural commodities for that is .contrary to and would defeat the very purpose
of the act, namely, to raise money to effect acreage or production reduction.
The Act is readily distinguishable from the Acts involved
v. Wallace."i7 In both
in the Child Labor Tax Case"16 and H Zll
"- 273 N. S. 418 (1926).
'N3ote, Municipalities in Competition With Private Business, 34
Col. L. Rev. 324 (Feb., 1934); Bird & Ryan, Public Ownership on Trial
(1930); Standard Oil Co. v. City of LincoZn, supra, n. 81; Jones v. City
of Portland, 245 U. S. 217 (1917).
n4 See Nebbia v. People (U. S., Sup. Ct., Mar. 5, 1934), for a recent decision in which the idea that prices cannot be as readily regulated in the interest of the public as other things seems at last to have
been exploded.
"'Report of A. A. A. 1933-34, Financial Report, Ch. 19. See also
Chas' N. Goodwin, The Processing Tax, 11 Tax Mag. 330 (Sept., 1933).
"u68upra, n. 91.
2ISupra, n. 91.
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of these cases what was called a tax was in fact a penalty imposed on a course of conduct not within the regulatory powers
of Congress. Certainly there is, in the Process Tax, no attempt
to regulate the processor by taxing a departure from a prescribed course of conduct since no alternative is suggested by
which the tax can be avoided other than going out of business
which obviously is not intended. In the Child Labor Tax Cases
the statute showed on its face that Congress intended to penalize the employment of children below a specific age -when done
with knowledge of that fact. If the act had been a revenue
measure imposed on the manufacture of certain commodities to
be used for the purpose of disseminating literature on the evils
of child labor, a different question would have been involved.
And if Hill v. Wallace had involved a tax for revenue to be
used in establishing a Federal Farm Loan Fund it would no
118
doubt have been held valid.
The Process Tax is a revenue measure. The money is intended to be spent partially for the control of production thus
incidentally affecting prices by decreasing the supply. Aside
from the expenditure of the tax there is obviously no intent to
regulate or even affect prices, since the only prices directly affected by the tax are affected adversely to the purpose of the
act. 119 There is obviously no attempt to control the prices directly by means of coercion which the processor must pay the
producer. It is merely intended that by controlling supply the
price will be raised. 120 This is not price fixing since no prices
are set and the buyer and seller are free to fix their own prices.
Neither has the Act had the effect in practice of price fixing.
Prices have fluctuated widely since the Act went into effect.
The farmer is certainly in no position to complain of price
regulation since the plan is optional 22 with those who enter
into it and other farmers, if affected at all, are affected benefi12
cially. 3
= See Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U. S. 180 (1921);
Sehaff v. So. Dak. Rural Credits Board, 39 So. Dak. 377-, 164 N. W. 964
(1917).

11Aside froin the expenditure of the tax its effect would be to decrease the price to the producer and increase it to the consumer.
210 See Hampton & Co. v. United States, supra, n. 67.
See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447 (1923).
I" See Note, Who May Test the Constitutionality of a Statute,
supra, n. 23.
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It is submitted that the Process Tax, though it is to be expended for control of production, is a uniform excise tax levied
for the sole purpose of raising revenue. 12 4 Thus the whole
question of its validity turns on the purpose for which it is to
be spent. It is further submitted that an expenditure for the
purpose of controlling production is a valid public purpose and
if gained only by financial inducement and not by coercion does
not involve an invasion of the regulatory, power of the states.' 25
There has been considerable agitation for a system of control which will force the cooperation of all farmers because,
due to the fact that the present plan is voluntary, some have
stayed out and increased production thus setting at naught the
efforts of those who have cooperated with the government
under the rental and benefit payment plan of the Agricultural
Adjustment Act. The difficulty of finding authorization in the
Federal Constitution for compulsory control of production is
much greater than it is to find authorization for securing control through voluntary agreements induced by financial compensation. It is conceded by all that there is no express authorization in the Constitution for Federal regulation of production
unless production is interstate commerce. If the power exists
it must therefore be an implied power or a power arising of
necessity out of the exercise of an express power.' 26 The question again arises whether the taxing power may be exercised
in a manner to secure the desired control over production of
agricultural commodities. The answer must depend upon
whether a tax can be levied in such a manner that its incidental
burden will effect the desired control without violating the constitutional requirement of uniformity and without violating the
principles of classification required by the due process clauseof the Fifth Amendment. And the tax must be a tax and not a
penalty upon the departure from a prescribed course of conduct not within the regulatory power of the Federal Government. It would be very easy to reduce the total production of
21The requirement of uniformity in
the Federal Constitution
means geographical uniformity. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107
(1911); Stanton.v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 U. S. 103 (1916).
See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447 (1923).
"Any tax is a discouragement and therefore a regulation so far
as it goes . . ." Pacific American Fisheries v. Alaska, 269 U. S.
269, 277 "(1925).
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a particular commodity by imposing a heavy excise on some
process-it undergoes on its way to the consumer. Such a tax,
however, would be a burden to the industry, not a benefit. Reduction of production is not itself the goal to be attained; it is
only a means to an end, the end being to increase the returns to
the individual producer by so limiting the supply as to effect
such -an increase in the price level that the smaller amount produced will sell for more than an unlimited amount at prices prevailing under such circumstances. 12 7 This would be comparatively simple if we were interested only in increasing the price
or exchange value of the total production of a single commodity
without regard to the distributioif of benefits and the sharing
of burdens. But the exchange value of one commodity obviously cannot be raised 'without lowering the exchange value
in terms of that commodity of the commodities for which it is
to be exchanged. And production of certain commodities cannot be curtailed without releasing productive capacity which
must be absorbed in the production of something else or result
in a pro tanto curtailment of the total production. Thus if
the production of a particular crop is curtailed it means a release of lands available for other crops, labor displacement and
a decreased exchange value for other commodities and products for, which it is exchanged. These factors should be considered in determining the advisability of limiting the production of a particular product, but when it has been determined
that production shall be curtailed, regulation and direction of
such economic by-products are beyond the scope of a tax
measure.
There are many difficulties involved in devising a tax
measure which will raise the price of a particular commodity
and at the same time bring about increased returns to a majority of the producers of that commodity. Obviously if this is
to be accomplished the measure must effect an equitable apporI= Even though the total amount paid for a large crop by the ultimate consumer may be greater than is paid for a smaller one, the total
amount received by the farmers for a small crop is generally greater
than for the larger crop. The handling charges such as storage and
freight are generally the same per unit and the price received per unit
is much greater resulting in a greater profit on the smaller crop for
the farmers. See Edwin R. A. Seligman, Economics of Farm Relief
(1928), p. 87 et seq.; Black, Agricultural Reforms in the United States,
Ch. IV, The Effect of Surpluses on Prices and Incomes.
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tionment of the total reduction caused by the tax so that the
amount each may produce will bring more at the advanced
prices than they would have produced without the limitation.
What devices are available to secure this result! Congress
may levy an excise tax subject only to the limitation that it be
uniform. The power to levy a tax includes the power to select
the subjects and objects upon which it shall rest from whence
the power to exempt and classify is derived.' 28 The method
by which it is proposed to control production is based upon
these powers. The idea is to impose a heavy tax, the burden of
which will fall upon- the production of the comnodity, and to
grant exemptions to individual producers in amounts the total
of which will correspond roughly to the amount of the product
it is thought desirable to have produced. Thus the burden of
the tax falls only upon production in excess of the amount desired. The legal as well as the practical difficulty lies in establishing a formula for determining an equitable exemption for
each individual producer which is uniform and which is based
upon a reasonable classification. The plan can be effective only
if the tax upon the excess is sufficiently heavy to discourage its
production. Yet it is impossible for a farmer to gauge his production to his exemption with any great degree of accuracy
because of the fluctuations in yield per acre due to such contingencies as drought, wind, floods, hail, insects, and plant disease. 129

But this relates to the wisdom of such legislation

rather than the difficulty of finding a legal basis for determining the individual exemption from the tax.
The Bankhead Cotton Control Bill as amended and passed
by Congress, 2 0 hereafter to be referred to as the "Cotton Control Act," affords an illustration as well as a point of departure for the discussion of an attempt to control the production
= The power to exempt is based upon the selection of the subject
of taxation and must be based upon a reasonable classification. See
Citizcns Telephone Co. v. Puller, 229 U. S. 322 (1912); In Re Opinion
of the Justices, 149 Atl. 321, 329 (N. H., 1930).
'-"The
variation of the (total) annual crop depends far more on
the yield per acre than on the amount of acreage." Edwin R. A. Seligman, Economics of Farm Relief (1928), p. 61. Of course this might
not be true if the amount of acreage fluctuated much. Naturally if
the acreage remains fairly constant the variation will not depend on
the amount of acreage.
11H. R. 8402, 73rd Congress, Mar. 20, 1934.
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by compulsory methods, of an important agricultural crop. It
is drawn in a manner to indicate that reliance is placed upon
both the taxing power and the commerce power. 13 1 As the
author of the Act apparently relied largely on the taxing
power,1 3 2 I shall first discuss it in relation to that source of
power. I shall deal further with the Act in my discussion of
the Commerce clause as a source of power for the regulation of
production. A brief description of the Act will be necessary
in order to discuss the legal problems involved.
The Act is effective with respect to the crop year, 193435,133 and also as to crop year 1935-36 if the Secretary of Agriculture finds that two-thirds of the persons who control cotton
land favor it. 134 And the President may extend the Act to include the crop year 1936-37 if he finds that the economic emergency in cotton production still exists.' 3 5 The Act provides
that not more than ten million bales shall be marketed out of
the crop grown in 1934-35 exempt from the payment of the
tax.130 With respect to other years in which the Act is in
effect, the Secretary of Agriculture is. required to estimate from
the probable market requirements and the quantity of cotton
available the quantity of cotton that should be marketed exempt
from the tax. 1'7
The Act then provides for a tax on the
ginning of cotton harvested during a crop year in which the
Act is in effect. The rate of the tax is 50 per cent of the average central market price of the lint cotton produced from the
ginning, but in no event less than five cents per pound. 138 The
act applies regardless of when the cotton is ginned,139 and seed
'Id.,Declaration of Policy and Sec. 5.
1' See "Extension of Remarks of Senator Bankhead." Constitutionality of Cotton Allotment Bill, by Alex. Holtzoff, 78 Cong. Rec., 2nd
Sess., p. 4116 (1934).
Cotton Control Act, op. cit., Sec. 2.
Cotton Control Act, op. cit., Sec. 2, 3 (a). This unusual provision
is not a necessary part of a control plan and since the act has a "Separability of Provisions" clause I shall not discuss this feature of the
Act. Cf. Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649 (1892); Seattle Trust Co. v.
Roberge, 278 U. S. 116 (1928); People of Porto Rico v. Havemeyer, 60
Fed. (2nd) 10 (C. C. A., 1st 1932); Van Cleve v. Passaic Valley Sewerage Comm., 71 N. J. Law 570, 60 At. 214, 108 Am. St. Rep. 754 (1905).
'-Id.
'Id., See. 3 (c).
32TId.,

Sec. 3 (a).

11Id., Sec. 4 (a).
= AIbid.
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(unginned) cotton cannot be exported. 140 Cotton harvested by
any publicly owned experimental station, an amount of catton
harvested from each farm equal to its allotment, and cotton
harvested prior to the crop year 1934-35 is not subject to the
tax.141 The Act provides for a system of tax exemption certificates which are distributed to producers in amounts equal to
their allotment together with bale tags for the identification of
the cotton which is not subject to the ginning tax.
It will be noticed, that while the tax is laid on ginning,
the so-called exemption is not given to the ginner but to the
producer in the form of an allotment. Hence it is not really an
exemption at all, but a classification of the ginning of cotton
into taxable and non-taxable categories according to whether
the cotton being ginned was produced in a particular year within some farmer's allotment. 142 And the farmer, who is subject
to no tax at all, is given tax exemption certificates on an amount
of cotton allotted to him on the basis provided by the Act on
condition that he agrees to be bound by such conditions and
limitations as may be imposed by the Agricultural Adjustment
Administration. 43 And if he refuses to make such an agreement or produces cotton in excess of the allotment he receives,
his cotton, or that excess of it, is tainted and cannot be ginned
by anyone without the payment of an exorbitant tax.
The constitutionality of the Act may be attacked from several angles. Some of the objections are of primary concern to
the ginner and some to the producer. However, since both the
ginner and the producer are directly affected by the act and the
provisions which concern each most directly are mutually dependent, 144 either may rely upon the objections which may be
45
raised by the other.'
Id., See. 13 (c).
'l.Id.,Sec. 4 (e), 1, 2, 3.
11 "Exemption is an immunity or privilege-it is freedom from a
charge or burden to which others are subject." State v. Smith, 158 Inil.
543, 63 N. E. 25 (1902).
4

'1

'-

Cotton Control Act, op. cit., Sec. 6.

'"Obviously the Act as a whole must fall if either the tax or the
allotment plan is invalid. Cf. Williams v. Stanlard Oil Co., 278 U. S.
235 (1927); Connozy v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S. 540 (1901);
Note, Inseparability of Provisions, 40 H. L. R. 676.
5 EmpZoyers Liability Cases, 207 U. S. 463 (1908); N. Y. Central
R?. R. Co. v. White, 243 U. S. 188 (1917); Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33,

38 (1915).
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Is TnE DISTINCTION BETWEEN TAXABLE AND NON-TAXABLE

OPER-

ATION S BASED UPON A REASONABLE CLASSIFICATION?

One of the first questions which is presented by the act is
the validity of a tax which applies only to the ginning of cotton
which has not been raised within a farmer's allotment. There
can be no objection to an excise on the ginning of some cotton
which does not apply to the ginning of all cotton if the difference in result is based upon a valid classification either of the
ginners 1"6 or the cotton. 14 7 But the classification, must be reasonable and be grounded in the purposes and objects of taxa48
tion.'
The transaction upon which the tax in the Cotton Control
Act is laid is exactly the same as the transaction which is tax
free. The tax is on the ginning of cotton which is in all respects identical and without regard to how, when, or where it
is ginned or who gins it. Bale tags are necessary to identify the
taxable bales from the ones that are non-taxable. The liability
to a tax depends upon circumstances wholly irrelevant to the
transaction being taxed, i. e., whether the farmer who produced
the cotton received an allotment 149 or whether it was produced
in excess of an allotment or in violation of the regulations of the
Agricultural Adjustment Administration. Such a basis for liability to taxation is clearly not an ekxercise of the right to select
either the objects or subjects of taxation. It is rather an effort
to reach beyond the jurisdiction of the taxing authority through
a perversion of the legitimate purposes of classification. It is
a classification based solely on a foundation devised to secure
a result which Congress has no power to secure directly. If
Congress were allowed to do this "it would open the way for
easily doing directly what is forbidden to be done indirectly,
and would render important constitutional limitations of no
avail."'Is
The Child Labor Tax Case' 51 suggests an illustra'1American Sugar Refining Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U. S. 89 (1900).
24?MeCray v. United States, 195 U. S. 27 (1904); Billings v. United

States, 232 U. S. 261 (1913).
'8Watson v. Comptroller, 254 U. S. 122 (1920).
19Under
Sec. 6 of the Cotton Control Act, no allotment may be
made to a producer who refuses to agree to such conditions and limitations as the A. A. A. shall impose regarding its reduction program
generally.
WFrick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473, 494 (1925); Cf. Child Labor
Tax Case, 259 U. S. 20 (1922), in which the court said, "Grant the
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tion of how this could be done. Instead of imposing a tax on
incomes received from operations in wweh children were knowingly employed a heavy excise could be levied upon all such
operations with an exemption to all who did not employ children. The illustration stated differs little from what was actually done and condemned by the Court and would undoubtedly
fall within the principle of that case.
52
The case of Standard Oil Co. v. City of Fredericksburg'
decided by the Supreme Court of Virginia involves a situation
highly analagous to the situation raised by the Cotton Control
Bill. That case involved the validity of a law which imposed a
license tax on the sale of oil which was transported in bulk,
tank cars, or through pipes for distribution, but which did not
apply to the sale of oil which was transported in barrels. The
Court, holding that the law denied due process, said:
"The business reached by the ordinance is the 'selling to wholesale or retail merchants in this city . . . oil' and is not the business of buying and selling dil. The method or manner by which the
oil is introduced into the city before a sale can hardly be said to bear
a just and proper relation, or, in fact, any relation at all to the actual
sale of the oil. . . . The business is the selling of oil to wholesale
and retail merchants, and the tax is not placed upon all who sell to
wholesale or retail merchants in the city, but is placed only on those
who sell . . . and whose oil, which is the subject of sale, shall
have been transported into the city in tank cars or in pipes. .
"There is nothing of difference in the two businesses of selling oil,
arising from the method by which the oil was transported into the city
that would naturally suggest the justice or expediency of diverse legislation with respect to the classification attempted in this section."

The business upon which the tax is levied in the Cotton
Control Act is the ginning of cotton, not the production and
ginning of cotton. The method or amount of cotton produced,
like the method of introducing the oil into the city, bears no
relation to the ginning of the cotton. Just as the license tax did
validity of this law and all that Congress would need to do, liereafter,
in seeking to take over to its control any one of the great number of
subjects of public interest, jurisdiction of which the states have never
parted with, and which are reserved to them by the Tenth Amendment, would be to enact a detailed measure of complete regulation of
the subject and enforce it by a so-called tax upon departures from it.
To give such magic to the word "tax" would be to break down all constitutional limitations of the powers of Congress and completely wipe
out the sovereignty of the states." The same reasoning applies to a
"tax" on a "class" chosen arbitrarily for its regulatory effect.
'5Ibid.
1105 Va. 82, 52 S. E. 817 (1906).
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not apply to all who sold oil, the ginning tax is not applicable
to all who gin cotton. The license tax applied only to those
who transported oil in tank cars or in pipes. The ginning tax
applies only to those who gin cotton grown in excess of a quota
or grown by a farmer who refuses to comply with the regulations of the A. A. A. in regard to his remaining acreage. There
is thus no valid distinction in the ginning of cotton arising out
of the source of production. 153 The ginning tax is the harder
of the two to support since there is a possibility that a transportation tax which applied only to pipe lines and tank cars
could be sustained if it applied only to intrastate commerce. 154
But a local license tax if imposed on the sale of oil above a certain quota, which was transported in interstate comnierce,
would clearly be void as a regulation of interstate commerce.5
But, it seems, no more clearly so than a Federal tax on the
ginning of cotton produced in excess of a quota is void as a
regulation of the int6rnal affairs of a State. The decision in
McCray v. United States 56 is not in conflict with these views
but rather tends strongly to support them. The court recognized that a classification might be so arbitrary as to violate the
Fifth Amendment,' 57 but held that it was a proper exercise of
the right to select the objects of taxation to distinguish between
colored margarine and the uncolored article. The classification
was based upon a difference in fact and was thus supportable
without reference to the motives which suggested it. 5 8 The
classification in the Cotton Control Act is not based upon a
difference in fact between taxable and non-taxable transactions
but relates solely to the objectives which the Act is designed to
secure, controlled production.
A parallel hypothetical case with reference to a tax on
20A classification of goods by reason of their origin through convict labor in imposing a license for selling goods is unreasonable and
void. People ex rel. Phillips v. Roynes, 136 N. Y. App. Div. 417, 120
N. Y. Supp. 1053 (1910); see also People ex rel. Moskowitz v. Jenkins,
202 N. Y. 53, 94 N. E. 1065, 35 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1079 (1911), holding
invalid a license tax which applied only to sellers of bankrupt stock.
See Quong Wing v. Kirkendall, 223 U. S. 59 (1912).
'mStandard Oil Co. v. Graves, 249 U. S. 389 (1918); Walling v.
Michigan, 116 U. S. 446 (1885); Pueblo v. Lukins, 63 Colo. 197, 164 Pac.
1164 (1917).
= 195 U. S. 27 (1904).
ulIbid., p. 64.
'

Cf. Powell v. Pennslyjvania, 127 U. S. 678 (1887).
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margarine will demonstrate the essential difference between
the problem involved in the McCray case and that raised by
the Cotton Control Act. Suppose a tax were levied on the
sale of all margarine with a stipulation that inargarine received
from manufacturers who manufactured only an amount alloted
to it by Congress and who agreed to such conditions and limitations regarding the manufacture of vegetable oils, lard and
butter as the government should impose could be sold tax free.
The mere statement of the parallel demonstrates the inapplicability of the principles enunciated in the McCray case.115 9
The case of Liggett v. L60
e 0 involved a State tax on sales
by chain stores which was graduated successively according to
the number of counties in which stores were located. The court
held that a tax based on such a classification was contrary to
the Fourteenth Amendment on the ground that the tax arbitrarily discriminated between persons of the same class, the
attempted distinction being wholly irrelevant to the subject of
the tax, i. e., sales by chain stores. While there is no "Equal
Protection" clause in the Fifth Amendment it is believed that
a similar tax if imposed by Congress would be held to violate
the "Due Process" clause on the ground that an exaction based
upon such an arbitrary basis would amount to confiscation of
the property of those from whom it was exacted. 161
In Heiner v. Donnan'62 the court held that a tax on gifts
which applied only to gifts made within a period of two years
preceding the death of the donor could not be sustained on the
'a

Such a statute would clearly seem to fall within the principle of

Hill v. Wallace, supra; n. 91, and The Child, Labor Tax Case, supra,
n. 91.
-o288 U. S. 517 (1931).
' See N¢ichols v. Coolicge, 274 U. S. 531 (1927); Barclay & Co. v.
Rdwards, 267 U. S. 442, 450 (1924); State v. Crosson, 33 Idaho 140,
190 Pac. 922 (1920). In the last case cited, the Supreme Court of
Idaho held that a license tax which applied to all common carriers
except those operating between hotels and trains was in violation of
the state "Due Process" clause because it resulted in discrimination
between those within the same class.
- 285 U. S. 312 (1932). A Federal estate tax which levied a tax on
transfers made in contemplation of death provided that all transfers
made within two years prior to the decedent's death were conclusively
presumed'to be in contemplation of death. The court held that an opportunity to show the facts denied due process. It was then urged
that the tax could be sustained as a gift or transfer tax. But the court
held that the act, so interpreted, equally denied due process. Cf. Schlesinger v. State of Wisconsin, 270 U. S. 230 (1926).
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ground that there was no valid distinction between such gifts
and gifts made at other times and that a classification so arbitrary and capricious resulted in a denial of due process of
03
law.'
It is difficult to see even as much justification for classifying the ginning of cotton according to whether the farher who
grew it has complied with Federal regulations as to the amount
he shall be permitted to grow as for classifying gifts according
to their proximity to the donor's death for in so classifying
gifts Congress was not levying a tax burden upon a subject it
could not otherwise reach. However, if the Act were valid in
all other respects, it is believed that the objections to the nature
of the classification which have been urged could be avoided
without seriously changing the operation of the Act in practice. The practical operation of the Act would not be greatly
affected if, instead of a tax on ginning of cotton from farms in
excess of a producer's allotment, a tax were laid upon the picking 64 of cotton with an exemption for all producers, 65 the
amount of which would be ascertained in the same manner as
the act provides for determining the amount of tax exemption
certificates to which each producer is entitled. The payment
and collection of the tax could be postponed until it was
ginned.' 06 The tax would then be upon a specific transaction
'11 See also Brushaberv. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 240 U. S. 1 (1916),
where the court referring to the doctrine that the Fifth Amendment

does not limit the taxing power said,

".

.

. that this doctrine

would have no application in a case where although there was a seeming exercise of the taxing power, the act complained of was so arbitrary
as to constrain to the conclusion that it was not the exertion of the
taxing power but a confiscation of property, that is, a taking of the
same in violation of the Fifth Amendment, or what is its equivalent
thereto, was so wanting in basis for classification as to produce such
gross and patent inequalities as to inevitably lead to the same conclusion."
6'A tax on picking seems just as easily sustainable as an excise
as a tax on ginning. One transaction is successive to the other but
both are essential to obtain any substantial benefit from the property.
Cf. Dawson v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., 255 U. S. 288 (1920). The tax
on ginning seems more objectionable than on picking from the standpoint of a direct tax since it is a tax on the ginning of cotton because
it belongs to a particular farmer. A tax which is levied because of
ownership is direct. Bromley v. McCaugn, 280 U. S. 124 (1919). But
a tax on one incident of ownership is indirect. Id.
'5 Producers may be exempted from an excise which applies to
non-producers. American Sugar Refining Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U. S.
89 (1900).
'1 Payment may be postponed, Salomon v. State Tax Commission,
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with an exemption to a class of persons who engage in such
transactions. Assuming that a tax on picking cotton could be
sustained as an excise the only remaining question would be the
validity of the basis for the allowance of exemptions, that is
whether it had attached to it any unlawful conditions resulting
in a violation of the Tenth Amendment or was so arbitrary as
to violate the Fifth.
A change in the Act such as has been suggested, while it
might eliminate the objection that the tax is based upon an
arbitrary classification, would not remove the features of the
Act which may be urged as a violation of the Tenth Amendment
and would leave unsolved the question whether the method of
allotment devised by the Act is so arbitrary as to amount to
denial of due process. These problems will be considered next
in the order named.
DOES THE COTTON CONTROL ACT VIOLATE THE TENTH
AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONI

A reading of the Act from beginning to end indicates at
once that it is not a revenue measure. The declaration of policy
and the whole tenor of the act makes clear what everybody,
including the Supreme Court, knows, that the purpose of the
Act is not to raise revenue but to raise the price of cotton for
the purpose of increasing the returns to the cotton farmer by
imposing a prohibitive tax on the ginning of cotton in excess
of an amount that, according, to a government estimate, will be
demanded at a "parity" price. 167 'While the tax is laid upon
the ginning of cotton, not upon its production, it will have the
effect of imposing a penalty upon production in excess of a
quota which may be ginned tax free. Since the ginner must
pay a heavy tax upon the ginning of coton purchased from or
ginned for a farmer who has no allotment 6 s and on the ginning
of cotton produced in excess of an allotment he has no choice
but to charge a radically different price for ginning it, or if he
278 U. S. 484 (1929), and the tax collected at the gin. Brushaber v.
Union, Pacific R. R. Go., 240 U. S. 1 (1916).
261Hearings Before the Committee on Agriculture, House of Representatives,. 73 Cong., 2nd Sess., H. R. 8402, Feb. 2-17, 1934.
'11 See. 6, Cotton Control Act, op. cit., 1irovides that no allotment
shall be made to any producer unless he agrees to the conditions and
limitations of the A. A. A. regarding its reduction program generally.
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purchases the cotton, to pay the farmer a greatly reduced price
for it. The rate of the tax is such as to destroy any possibility
of raising such cotton at a profit. 169

The question then is whether the machinery set up to effect
this result can be sustained as an exercise of the power to tax.
If so the motives which prompted the exercise of the taxing
power cannot affect its validity. 170 Let us then examine the
machinery of the Act to see what devices have been used.
Under the heading, "Taxation and Exemption," the Act,
after imposing a tax equal to 50 per cent of the market price
with a minimum of five cents per pound on the ginning of cotton"'' provides :172
"(e) No tax shall be imposed under this act with respect to(2) An amount of cotton harvested in any crop year from each
farm equal to its allotment."

As may be seen from this provision, the Act does not exempt
a certain amount or a certain kind or quality of cotton to all
ginners."' 3 The liability of the ginner to the payment of a tax
on the ginning of cotton depends entirely upon whether it is
purchased from a farmer who has produced it within an allotment or quota imposed upon him by Congress and who has, in
addition, agreed to be bound by such conditions and limitations
regarding his remaining acreage as the Agricultural Adjustment Administration shall prescribe." 74 Thus the liability to
pay a tax on ginning cotton is made to depend upon circumstances which are wholly extraneous to the operation upon
which the tax is levied and which are entirely beyond the juiisdiction of the taxing authority."Y5 While the tax purports to
be upon ginning its true effect is to impose a heavy burden upon
the departure from a course of conduct by destroying the
market value of cotton which is not produced according to regu2'cThe tax is.so designed that it takes a major portion of the returns whatever the market price, the rate of the tax being a fixed percentage of the market price.
'"McCray v. U. S., supra, n. 92.
"'Sec. 4 (a).
2'2Sec. 4 (e), subsec. (2).
' Such an exemption would be valid. Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S.
41, 109 (1899); Magoun v. Illinois Trust and Savings Bank, 170 U. S.
283, 293 (1897).
2'Cotton Control Bill, op cit., Sec. 6.
11 See Frick v. Pennsylvania, 285 U. S. 312 (1932).

K. L. J.-8
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lations made under the authority of Congress. The Act therefore appears to fall clearly within the principle of Hill v. Wallace"76 and The Child Labor Case" 7 in which it was held that
regulatory power over a subject not within the powers of Congress was a violation of the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution.
H7ill v. Wallace involved the Grain Futures Act which imposed a tax which could be avoided by compliance with certain
prescribed regulations. The court held that the so-called tax
was, in fact, a penalty to coerce the members of the Board into
compliance with regulations which Congress had no authority
to prescribe and was therefore a violation of the Tenth Amendmeniit. A quotation from the Cotton Bill will demonstrate the
applicability of that decision. Section 6 provides:
"No certificate of exemption shall be issued and. no allotment shall
be made to any producer unless he agrees to comply with such conditions and limitations on the production of agricultural commodities
by him as the Secretary of Agriculture may, from time to time, prescribe to assure the cooperation of such producer in the reduction
programs of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration and to prevent expansion of competitive production by such producer of agricultural other than cotton and the allotment of and certificates of exemption issued to any producer shall be subject to revocation on violation by him of such conditions and limitations."

The effect of this section is to impose conditions upon the
farmer that are wholly unrelated to the levy or collection of
any tax. It means that the farmer 'must submit to the control
of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration not only in the
production of cotton but in the production of other commodities also or bear the burden of a tax equal to 50 per cent of the
market price on all the cotton he has to sell. This certainly
amounts to the imposition of a drastic penalty on the refusal
to comply with conditions entirely beyond congressional
power.' 7 8 It is a regulatory measure pure and simple devised
for the purpose of preventing cotton farmers .who have been
forced by the tax to reduce cotton acreage from planting their
excess acres to other crops in direct opposition to the policy of
I' Bupra, n. 91.
UI Supra, n. 91.

28 Hill v. Wallace, supra, n. 91. This statement is made on the assumption that Congress has no power to impose such conditions under
the commerce clause, a question which will be discussed later. Cf.
Chicago Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U. S. 1 (1923).
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the A.A.A. to reduce production of other crops. Without it
corn, wheat, tobacco, peanuts and many other crops which, are
being reduced under the A.A.A. would be immediately subjected to increased competition. This possibility was the very
reason for the insertion of the section and it is very unlikely
that the bill could have passed without it as the purpose of the
Act was to force the recalcitrant minority to co-operate with
the voluntary program of the A. A. A. 17 9 The necessity for
such a provision is not an argument in favor of its validity. It
merely demonstrates that the machinery of taxation, even with
an ingenious scheme of exemption and arbitrary classification
is not adapted to the compulsory control of production of agricultural commodities.
The Child Labor Tax Ca.e'80 is also a decision which
stands squarely in the way. A federal statute subjected employers who engaged in certain enumerated operations to a tax
of 10 per cent of the net income received from those operations
when children were knowingly employed in conducting those
operations. 'The court held the statute void as an attempt to
regulate child labor, a power not delegated to the Federal Government and, therefore, reserved to the States under the Tenth
Amendment.
In order to see more clearly the applicability of the Child
Labor Tax Case to the problem under discussion, let us suppose
the levy of a tax by Congress on the ginning of cotton with a
provision that the tax shall not apply to cotton produced by
farmers who do not employ children below certain ages in its
production, instead of the provision in the Cotton Bill that the
tax shall not apply to cotton produced by a farmer within his
allotment. If the one is regulation of Child Labor, the other is
regulation of production. In both cases the attempted classification is based upon considerations over which Congress has no
jurisdiction and which bears no reasonable relation to the exercise of the taxing power. Both are equally within the principle
of the Child Labor Tax Case which holds such regulation to be
11Hearings before the Committee on Agriculture, House of Representatives on H. R. 8402. Feb. 12 to 17, 1934, at 9, 10, 73rd Congress, 2nd Session.
1w259 U. S. 20 (1922).
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in violation of the Tenth Amendment.' 8 ' The necessity for the
inclusion of regulatory provisions in a tax measure which is
designed to regulate production arises out of the fact that material reduction of one crop by political action gives rise to
many collateral problems which it is politically impossible to
ignore. Yet the only way to avoid clashing with the Tenth
Amendment is to refrain from conditioning the exemptions
froni the tax on the compliance with regulations concerning
these collateral problems. Unfortunately, there is no common
denominator to which the production of all crops, in which a
surplus is feared, may be reduced. Unless Congress is willing
to ignore the collateral problems.to which the reduction of particular crops give rise, no means of avoiding conflict with the
Tenth Amendment can be suggested. Assuming, however, that
the regulatory provisions are abandoned or are held valid under
the Commerce power, another fundamental difficulty remains.

Is

op DETERmiNING THE QUOTA OR EXEmPTION1
THE INDIVIDUAL PRODUCER COMPATIBLE WITH THE

THE METHOD

oF

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION?

The Cotton Bill lays no tax upon the producer as such.
But the tax exemption certificates are given to the producer.
This may have been an attempt by the draughtsman of the Act
to make it impossible for the producer to question the basis
upon which the amount of the iidividual allotment was determined. In economic effect, however, it makes little difference whether he sells cotton subject to the tax or gins it him-

self and pays the tax. This being so, the producer as well as
the ginner is in a position to attack the validity of the method
set up by the Act for determining what cotton falls within the
82
taxable and what in the non-taxable categories.'
181

The tax in the Child Labor Tax Case would have been invalid
even though it had applied to incomes received from operations in
which children were employed to produce goods for shipment in interstate commerce. Hammer v. Dagonart,274 U. S. 251 (1926). But see,
Chicago Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U. S. 1 (1923).
'BIIn Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 38 (1915), it was held that an
alien employee was entitled to restrain the enforcement of an Arizona
law making it a crime for employers to hire less than 80 per cent
native born citizens. It was urged that the employee could not attack
the statute because it was the employer who was subjected to prosecution for its violation. J. Holmes, in answer to this objection, said:
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It has been urged that a tax upon the ginning of cotton
which is made to depend upon whether the producer of it has
kept within an allotment issued to him by the government is
wholly arbitrary from the standpoint of classifying ginning
into different categories for the purpose of taxation. And due
to the necessary tie-up between the tax and the exemptions it
has been urged that the producer as well as the ginner could
rely on this objection. As a matter of fact, they are often the
same individual. It has been suggested, however, that this
particular difficulty could be met by imposing the tax on the
picking of the cotton with an exemption to each producer. But
even if the Act were unobjectionable on this score a serious
question as to the constitutionality of the Act would remain.
The question concerns the validity of the basis from which the
individual allotment or exemption is ascertained. There are
two main objections that may be urged against the validity of
the methods provided in the Act. First, it can be urged that
the bases of the exemption or allotment are wholly arbitrary
and unreasonable and result in a violation of the "Due Process"
clause and second, it can be urged that the tax vhen considered
with the method of allotment or exemption is not uniform. I
shall consider these objections in the order named in relation to
the methods of allotment provided in the Cotton Bill.
Is THE BASIs op

ALLOTMENT OR EXEMPTION ARBITRARy

AND

UNREASONABLE AND IN VIOLATION OF THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT?

The allotment is the method provided by the Act for ascertaining how much cotton each producer may produce subject to
no tax burden. From the standpoint of due process of law it
makes no difference whether we are dealing with a classification
or an exemption. If a tax burden falls upon some but not upon
others or in different amounts or with greater weight on some
than on others it must be on some rational basis of distinction.
Congress has the power to classify the transaction upon which
the tax is laid according to different classes who engage in it,
"The act operates directly uplon the employment af aliens and if enforced would compel the employer to discharge a sufficient number
of employees to bring the alien quota within the prescribed limits....
It is therefore idle to call the injury indirect or remote."
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as, for example, producers and non-producers. 183 It may
classify the transaction according. to substantial differences in
the article upon which it is performed, as, for example, long
staple and short staple cotton.' 8 4 Or it may exempt some part
of the transactions to all the members of the class upon which
it is laid. 8 5 But an exemption of a part of the transactions is
only a sub-classification of the transaction itself and must be
based upon some rational principle so that. all who are similarly
circumstanced will receive substantially the same exemptions.
If the basis upon which exemptions are determined is wholly
arbitrary the statute violates the Fifth Amendment.'8 "
The Cotton Control Act provides that allotments may be
made from the county's allotment to any farm upon application
by the producer and may be based upon:
"(1) A percentage of the annual cotton production of the farm
for a fair representative period; or
(2) By ascertaining the amount of cotton the farm would have
produced during a fair representative period if all the cultivated land
had been planted to cotton, and then reducing such amount by such
percentage (which shall be applied uniformly within the county to all
forms to which the allotment is made under this paragraph) as will
be sufficient to bring the total of the farm allotments with the country's
allotment; or
(3) Upon such basis as the Secretary of Agriculture deems fair
and just, and will apply to all farms to which the alloment is made
under this paragraph uniformly, within the county, on the basis of
classification adopted. The Secretary of Agriculture in determining
the manner of allotment to individual farmers, shall provide that the
farmers who have voluntarily reduced their cotton acreage shall not
be penalized in favor of those farmers who have not done so. ' ,,
(b) After the crop year 1934-35 the apportionment shall not be
on the basis set out in paragraph (1) of subsection (a) of this section.'s
2American Sugar Refining Co. v. Louisiana, supra, n. 165.
28'Mcray v. United States, supra, n. 92. o
Knowlton v. Moore, supra, n. 173.
'8*Heiner
v. Donnan, supra, n. 162; Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U. S.
531 (1927); Citizens Telephone Co. v. Fuller, 229 U. S. 322 (1912);
La Belle Iron Works v. United States, 256 U. S. 377 (1921); State v.
Crosson, 33 Idaho 140, 190 Pac. 922 (1920); Cf. In Re Opinion of the
Justices, supra, n. 128, in which it was held unreasonable to exempt
married men from the income tax to the extent of $4,000 plus $400 for
each dependent while single men were exempted only on $2,000. And
an exemption of large timber tracts which did not apply to small ones
was also held unduly discriminatory though an exemption of the
smaller ones might have been sustained.
tm
See. 7 (a).
"I Sec. 7 (b).
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Under the terms of the Act, the Secretary may determine
the individual allotment or exemption on any one of these three
bases. The first of these makes the amount of cotton a producer, may have ginned tax free from a particular farm depend
upon the average amount of cotton that has been raised on the
farm from which his present crop is produced. To determine
the liability for the payment of a tax on the ginning of cotton
on the basis of the past uses to which the property on which it
was grown has been put is wholly arbitrary since it bears no
relation to the act now being performed on which the tax is
laid. The same would be true if the tax was on the picking of
the cotton. The effect of such a standard is to impose a burden
on a present transaction based upon past conduct wholly disconnected from the transaction upon which the present tax is
laid. Such a basis for determining liability to a tax seems to
be wholly arbitrary and capricious and in violation of the
Fifth Amendment.
Nichols v. Coolidge'5 9 involved a Federal estate tax which
purported to include within the value of the estate all property
which the decedent had at any time transferred to trustees
which was intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment
at or after his death even though the transfer was irrevocable.
The court held that the conveyhnee to the trustees was in no
sense testamentary and that it bore no substantial relationship
to the transfer by death. The following words of the court
seem peculiarly applicable to the situation under discussion.
"Under the theory advanced for the United States, the arbitrary,

whimsical and burdensome character of the challenged tax is plain

enough. An excise is prescribed, but the amount of it is made to depend upon past lawful transactions,nontestamentary in character and
beyond recall.

.

.

.

Different estates must bear disproportionate

burdens determined by what the deceased did one or twenty years before he died." (Italics the writer's.)

The court held that the tax was arbitrary and capricious
and amounted to confiscation. 190 Under the first method of
allotment in the Cotton Bill different farms would receive disproportionate quotas depending upon what the owner of the
- 274 U. S. 531 (1927).

S. 440 (1928), in
which it was held that a tax on gifts made prior to the passage of
the Act violated the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
29Ibid. See also Untermeyer v. Anderson, 276 U.
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This method obviously
farm had grown in years gone by.
favors the farmer who has grown the most cotton in the period
over which the estimate is made and penalizes the farmer who
has voluntarily reduced his acreage or who has grown other
crops. It is like basing an exemption fromi the present income
tax on a percentage of the past average income of the taxpayer,
or who ever he was successor to in business over a period of
years.

The second method of allotment, based upon what the land
would have produced over a period if all the cultivated land
had been planted to cotton, instead of what was actually produced is open to the same objections as the first method, and is,
in addition, based upon an estimate of very doubtful accuracy.192 Present liability for payment of taxes on a transaction in cotton is predicated upon an estimate of the average
amount of cotton that a theoretical farmer could have produced
if he had planted all the cultivated acres of the farm to cotton.
A more arbitrary and capricious method can hardly be imagined. It favors those who have not previously engaged in cotton cultivation and penalizes those whose land is especially
suited to cotton culture. Those who have no intention of shifting to cotton may apply for an allotment, thereby cutting down
the allotment of those who specialize in cotton. As the certificates are negotiable it will provide a means of exacting tribute,
through the sale of the tax exemption certificate, from the bona
193
fide cotton farmer.
The third method is a recognition of the arbitrary nature
of the first two. It sets up no standards at all for the guidance
of the Secretary, but leaves it up to him to devise a method that
is uniform and fair. Aside from the objection that this method
is an unlawful delegation of the taxing power to the Secretary,
its validity must depend upon the manner of its exercise. When
it is remembered, however, that the Secretary has the powet to
of Agriculture Henry A. Wallace, warns against the
present cotton producing regions and preventing abthe
of
"freezing
normal change over from cotton producing lands to non-cotton producing lands, and vice versa." Hearings before Committee of Agriculture, House of Representatives on H. R. 8402, Feb. 12-17, 1934,
p. 34.1
L1Id., at p. 33.
1"Id., at 33.
191Secretary
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fix the total exemptions limited only by a maximum, this becomes a very real objection. The amount of an exemption as
well as the rate enters into the determination of what the tax on
an individual shall be. 194 The general principle stated in Field
v. Clark1 95 and in the Hampton Case' 96 is that when the legislature lays down an intelligible principle or policy, "a primary
standard, "' 1 97 to guide the administrative discretion in filling
in the details of the statute by making rules and regulations,
and in applying the statute to factual situations upon which the
statute is intended to operate, then there is no unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power. It would hardly appear that
"such basis as the Secretary of Agriculture deems fair and
just, and will apply to all farms uniformly" could be called an
intelligible principle or standard. The provision that it shall
apply uniformly adds nothing as this is a limitation on the
Congressional power by the Constitution. "Such basis as the
Secretary of Agricultute deems fair and just," then, becomes
the only criterion as to the method of ascertaining the exemption to which one is entitled.
In People of Porto Rico v. Havemayer' 9 8 the legislature of
Porto Rico authorized the treasurer to determine the tax rate
by taking the estimate given him by the Commissioner of Interior of the amount necessary to-defray expenses for the ensuing year, deducting or adding the surplus or deficit of the
preceding year and dividing the total by the number of acres
in the district. The court held this to be an invalid delegation
since the rate was based upon an estimate of an administrative
officer. Instead of the rate, it is the basis on which the individual exemption is figured that is left to the administrative
system of taxation consists of two parts-the elements
'"Every
that enter into the composition of the tax and the steps taken for its
assessment and collection. The former is a legislative function conserved by constitutional prescriptions; the other is mere machinery.
The latter may be delegated to other governmental agencies; not so
the former . . . But no element that enters esentially into the
tax itself may be so delegated." Van Cleve v. Passaic Sewerage Com.,
71 N. J. L. 574, 60 Atl. 214, 108 Am. St. Rep. 754 (1905).
-9 143 U. S. 649 (1892).

"' Hampton v. United States, supra, n. 67.

191United States v. Shreveport Grain and Elevator Company, 287
U. S. 77 (1932).
11960 Fed. (2nd) 221 (C. C. A., 1st 1932); note, delegation of power
to tax, 1 Geo. Washington Law Rev. 231 (1932-33).
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officer in the Cotton Bill. But the latter is far more important
than the former because the purpose of the act hinges on keeping production within the exemptions prescribed. However, it
is very difficult to draw the line between what is and what is
not a delegation of legislative power and if no other objection
were available it is possible that the Act might be sustained
under such liberal decisions as United States v. Grimaud,199 the
Intermountain Rate Cases, 200 and Radio Comnmission v. Nelson
20 1
Bros.
All three methods of determining the individual exemption
from taxation seems objectionable on the further ground that
it is made to depend indirectly on the factors which determine
20 2
the quota of the State and the County in which he lives.
Some standard should be set up that bears some relation to the
transaction upon which the tax is laid and it should apply to all
who are similarly situated regardless of State and County
203
lines.
DOES THE TAx, WHEN

CONSIDERED

WITH

SATISFY THE CONSTITUTIONAL

THE

EXEMPTIONS,

REQUiREMENT

OF UNIFORPMITY?

Uniformity as used in the Constitution means geographical
4
But a tax which applies uniformly without exemptions cannot be geographically uniform if it is subject to
exemptions which are not uniform. And it cannot be uniform
if it is based upon a different classification within diffefent geographical areas. It makes no difference then whether the allotment is an exemption or a classification; it must be made on
the same basis without regard for geographical location.
See. 7 (a) of the Act provides three alternative methods of deuniformity. 20

1 220 U. S. 506 (1911).
234 U. S. 476 (1914).
2289 U. S. 266, 285 (1933). In granting licenses the Radio Commission was required to act "as public convenience, interest or
necessity requires." The court held that this standard was not so indefinite as to confer unlimited power.
02It is difficult to justify a basis of exemption which makes an
individual's liability to a Federal Tax on a present transaction depend
in any way upon the amount of cotton the state and county in which
he lives has raised in proportion to that raised in other states and
counties in the past five or ten years.
2Liggett v. Lee, 288 U. S. 577 (1933).
1Supra, n. 124.
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termining the individual allotment within a county. These
methods are very different and the results would vary greatly
according to the method adopted. 20 5 Yet the act authorizes the
Secretary to use any of the three methods providing only that
the method adopted applies uniformly within the county. But
the constitution is not satisfied by making Federal taxes unifornm within a county. For purposes of a Federal tax a person
is a citizen of the United States20 6 and the requirement of uniformity means that the tax must apply uniformly wherever the
subject is found.2 0 7 Exemptions cannot be made in order to
adapt it to local conditions. 20 8 The act would therefore seem
to be invalid because the method of determining individual exemptions is based upon geographical distinctions.
A method of determining the individual exemption which
is entirely fair seems impossible to devise due to the numerous
factors which enter into such consideration. Soil conditions,
weather conditions, capacity, specialization, crop rotation, market conditions, equipment, personal preference, intention, labor
conditions, and the like are all factors deserving of consideration in allocating production. Obviouisly no formula can be
Obviously the allotment of a farmer who had previously raised
very little cotton would differ greatly depending on whether a percentage of his past production or a percentage of an estimate of what
he could have produced -on his cultivated area is chosen by the Secretary of Agriculture as the basis of his allotment. Hence farmers
similarly situated but located in different counties might get totally
different allotments if one basis was used in one county and the other
in the other county.
2Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447 (1933).
21 Billings v. United States, supra, n. 147.
M'Florida v. Mellon, 273 U. S. 12 (1926). What is said in this case
about uniformity is a dictum because it was held that Florida had no
standing in court. But the dictum is of great importance because
legislation based upon the principle of this case has been suggested to
induce states to adopt unemployment insurance. The dictum appears
to be unsound. The law under consideration allowed a deduction up
to 80 per cent from the Federal Estate tax for any estate, inheritance,
or succession taxes paid to a state under a state law. Florida had no
state inheritance tax and could have none under its constitution. The
court said that Congress could not accommodate its legislation to conflicting or dissimilar laws of the states. But the effect of the decision
is to allow them to do just that. It is difficult to see how a law concerning a citizen of the United States can be said to operate uniformly
when its operation depends directly upon the existence or non-existence of a particular state law. The law would be uniform as to citizens
of different states if no deductions were allowed. Is it still uniform if
one is allowed a deduction from his Federal tax and the other is not,
due to the difference in state laws?
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devised to include them all. However, I shall venture to suggest a basis which, though it is no less unsatisfactory than those
?mbodied in the act from a practical point of view, is uniform
and not wholly arbitrary. Instead of basing the exemption on
a percentage of the past average production or a percentage
of the past productive capacity of cultivated acres, it could be
based on a percentage of the present productive capacity. The
past average production would be helpful in estimating the
present productive capacity. The percentage to be allowed
could be determined by dividing the total estimated capacity
of those who applied for exemptions into the amount desired
to be produced. Such a basis would not be wholly arbitrary
since Congress has the right in the public interest to exempt a
portion of the object of the tax from the tax burden. And the
capacity of the producer bears a direct relation to any amount
20 9
Congress chooses to exempt.
In United States v. Singer,2 10 the court sustained a liquor
manufacturing tax based upon the capacity of the distillery.
The excess profits tax 21' provided for a deduction from income
equal to the same percentage of the invested capital for the
taxable year which the average amount of, annual net income
of the trade or business during the pre-war period was to the
invested capital of that period. Since the tax was imposed on
excess profits a means of determining the excess had to be
chosen and the Court held that the method adopted by Congress was not wholly arbitrary. 212 It can hardly be denied that
the ratio of income to paid-in capital at different times does
bear some relation to the comparative profitableness of the enterprise. But the amount of cotton previously produced bears
no relation to the transaction being taxed in the Cotton Bill.
DoEs THE COTTON CONTROL BIL

VIOLATE ARTICLE 1 SECTION 8

OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION WHICH PROHIBITS THE

LEvY OF A TAX ON EXPORTS?-

The Cotton Control Act provides that lint cotton may not
be moved beyond the boundaries of the county in which it was
See Champlain Refinirg Co. v. Corp. Cor., 286 U. S. 210 (1932).
-1 15 Wall. 111 (U. S., 1872).
21140 Stat. at L. 300, 302, et seq.
=1La Belle Iron Works v. United States, 256 U. S. 377 (1921);
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produced except by permission of the Commissioner of Intermal
Revenue until the tax has been paid upon the ginning of it.213
And bales of lint cotton may not be opened or sold until the
tax is paid. 214 It further provides that no seed cotton shall be
exported from the United States to any foreign country. 215
"Seed cotton" is defined as the harvested fruit of the cotton
plant, 21 6 which is the same thing as lint cotton except the latter
217
has been ginned.
The gist of the situation is, then, that while seed cotton
may be transported freely from state to state, it cannot be exported to a foreign country. But lint cotton, which is merely
seed cotton which has been ginned, may be exported freely.
These provisions are obviously framed to prevent a farmer who
has not kept within his allotment from selling his seed cotton
abroad and thereby escaping the payment of the tax upon
the ginning of it. There is no prohibition against selling the
foreign buyer both the lint cotton and the seeds after the tax
has been paid upon the ginning of it. This is much the same
as requiring that the farmer who raises cotton which is not
exempt from the tax on ginning cannot export it without paying a tax on it. Is the tax void because of a tax on exports ?
A tax upon the ginning of cotton is clearly valid even as
to that which is to be exported. 218 A tax upon the exporting
of cotton is just as clearly invalid.2 19 If the tax is invalid, it
is because of the prohibition of the exportation of seed cotton
which goes along with the tax. The court has said time and
again that it will look through form to substance to see what
see A. A. Ballentine, Some Constitutional Aspects of the Excess Profits
Tax, 1329 Y. L. J. 625 (1919-20).
" op. cit., Sec. 14 (b).
:' Ibid.
15Ia., Sec. 14 (c).
21Id., Sec. 23 (g).
J-Id., Sec. 23 (f).
2' Cornell v. Coyne, 192 U. S. 418 (1904). The court might find
itself in an inconsistent position if it were to hold that ginning was
a part of interstate commerce rather than merely related to it in such
a manner as to require regulation. If production and ginning are a
part of interstate commerce it would logically follow that that which
was produced and ginned for export was a part of foreign commerce.
If the court holds that production and ginning are sufficiently relat"
to interstate commerce to warrant regulation by Congress the tax ginning can be sustained as an indirect burden on exports. Ibid. See
cases cited ante, n. 237.
"9U. S. Const., Art. 1, Sec. 8.
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the effect of a tax is. Obviously the effect of the tax when
taken with the prohibition of export is to impose the burden of
the tax upon the cotton which is exported. There is no public
policy which warrants the prohibition of the export of seed
cotton other than to enable the Government to collect the tax
upon it, the very thing prohibited by the Constitution.
The fact that no tax burden is imposed on such cotton that
is not imposed on cotton sold on the domestic market is not a
valid reason for sustaining the tax as to that which is exported. 220 Thus a State tax on gross sales is invalid as to
foreign sales. 221 The prohibition of export of cotton plus the
tax upon the ginning of the cotton certainly places as direct a
burden in fact upon the export of cotton as a gross sales tax
would. And it seems more direct than the burden imposed
upon foreign commerce by a statute requiring sellers of steamship tickets to take out a license. 222 A tax on a sale by a U anufacturer to a broker to fill an order from a foreign merchant is
invalid as a tax on exports where the title passes when the
223
property is delivered to the carrier.
The court can easily sustain the tax if it ignores the purpose for which the ban on export of seed cotton was made
merely by saying that the tax is on a transaction which is not
a part of foreign commerce. If it sustains the prohibition of
export and the tax on cotton ginned for export as well, it means
that Congress can do by indirection that which it cannot do
directly. 224 The court is not apt to be very acute on this point
unless it overthrows the act on other grounds, however, for the
result of holding these sections invalid would be to encourage
an exodus of all non-exempt cotton to be ginned in foreign
countries. It would thus fail to check the production of cotton
and result in further unemployment.
M. Heintz, Federal Prohibition of Export Taxes, 61 Am. L. Rev.
194 (1927). As the constitution has been construed, Congress may tax
exports from state to state but not exports to foreign countries.
2" Crew Levic Co. v. Pennsylvania, 245 U. S. 292 (1917); Cf. Di
Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.. S. 34 (1927).
2=Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, Ibid.
Spaulding Bros. v. Edwards, 262 U. S. 66 (1923).
24In Fairbanksv. U. S. 181 U. S. 283, it was held that a tax on a
foreign bill of Iaaing was in effect a tax on the goods it represented.
Cf. British Columbia v. McDonald Murphy Lumber Co. (1930), A. C.
357, in which the English court held that a general tax on cut lumber
with an exemption on lumber used at home was a tax on exports.
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If the objections urged against the validity of the Cotton
Control Bill as an exercise of the taxing power of Congress are
valid, it must be concluded that the power to tax does not afford
a satisfactory legal foundation for a comprehensive control of
Agricultural production. A tax upon some productive transaction with an exemption based upon productive capacity, even
if valid, affords little hope for effective regulation since it affords no source of power for correlating legislation dealing
with different crops or for handling the collateral problems
raised by such legislation.
CONTROL OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION UNDER THE
COMMERCE POWER

In Gibbons v. Ogden 225 Marshall, speaking of the commerce
power, asks: "What is this power?" and answers the question as follows:
It is the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule by which
commerce is to be governed. This power, like all others vested in Congress is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and
acknowledges no limitations other than are prescribed in the Constitution. . . . If, as has always been understood, the sovereignty of
Congress, though limited to specified objects, is plenary as to those
objects, the power over commerce with foreign nations, and among
the several states, is vested in Congress as absolutely as it would be
in a single government, having in it the same restrictions on the exercise of the power as are found in the Constitution of the United
States.

The Tenth Amendment does not limit the Federal power
over Congress in any way. It merely reserves to the States
all powers not delegated to Congress. The problem of delimiting the Federal power over commerce is a problem of determining what is and what is not a regulation of interstate commerce.
This is necessarily a judicial question for the Tenth Amendment would mean nothing if Congress has not only unlimited
power over commerce but also full power to determine what
activities fall within the scope of "commerce among the states."
There is a recognized distinction between the abuse of a power
and the scope of a power.22 7 Hence, while Congress is subject
9 Wheat. 1 (U. S., 1824).
=6Id., 196.
' "Questions of power do not depend ipon the degree to which it
may be exercised. If it may be exercised at all, it must be exercised at
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only to political responsibility for abuse of the power to regulate commerce 228 it is nevertheless subject to having the scope
of its powers, i. e., what constitutes regulation of commerce
among the states, defined by the Supreme Court. Hence, it
does not follow that "whether commnerce among the states
should be prohibited, and for what reasons were. . . questions
for Congress to determine, subject only to its political responsibility at the polls,"

229

unless it be conceded that prohibition of

commerce for any reasons whatever is a regulatio%of commerce.
Just as Congress may under the guise of the taxing power seek
o extend its power to police regulations 230 or the States in the
exercise of their taxing power may seek to regulate interstate
or foreign. commerce, 231 sd Congress may seek to prohibit commerce on such conditions as to extend its control into entirely
unauthorized fields. 23 2

Mr. Corwin's argument that Congress

may prohibit commerce for any reason it sees fit subject only to
political responsibility would extend to a-law which prohibited
divorced persons from traveling in interstate commerce with a
view to lessening the number of divorces; yet he expressly disavows that Congress has the power to bring within its control
matters in no wise related to the Interstate Market such as
marriage and divorce.2 33 This is an admission that the power
of Congress over interstate commerce is subject to review by
the Court, for if Congress cannot "use the power over commerce to bring within its control matters in no wise related to
the Interstate Market such as marriage and divorce," someone
(the Court) must decide "what matters are in no wise related
to the Interstate Market." And since such a question of relation is clearly a question of degree, the Court must decide when
the will of those in whose hands it is placed." Brown v. Maryland, 12
Wheat. 419 (U. S., 1827).
=Ibid.
= Quoted from Edward S. Corwin, Congress's Power to Prohibit
Commerce, 18 Cornell L. Q. 477, 485., where he maintains the thesis
that Congress may prohibit interstate commerce subject only to responsibility at the polls. His quotations only sustain his position if It

is granted that complete prohbition of commerce for any reasons wlever amount to a "reguZation of commerce among the states," the point
in issue.
2- Child Labor Tax Case, supra, n. 91.
=lDi Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U. S. 34 (1927).

tm

Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251 (1918).

2*Op. cit., p. 502.
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a matter is sufficiently unrelated to the Interstate Market so as
to be beyond the reach of the commerce power. Hammer v.
Dagenhart234 can be explained on this theory. The majority
of the Court thought that Child Labor was in no wise related
to interstate commerce. It did not define interstate commerce
as the Interstate Market as Mr. Corwin does,2 35 but envisaged
it merely as transportation and those things directly connected
therewith. And the hours and conditions of labor were not
thought by the majority of the court to be sufficiently related to
transportation to bring it within the regulatory powers of
Congress. If we grant the Court the power of defining "interstate commerce" and of determining what is related thereto it
is difficult to see how it can be argued that Hammer v. Dagenhart is an intrusion by the Court upon Congress's legislative
discretion.236 At most we can only quarrel with the definition
and the conclusion as to what is related thereto.
Congress has never before attempted an outright regulation of production. If such legislation is sustained, the Court
will be compelled either to enlarge upon its definition of interstate commerce or to recognize a different kind of relationship
than it has previously done. It will not be necessary, in order
to sustain the power of Congress to regulate production to hold
that interstate commerce includes production. It has long been
established 237 and has recently been reaffirmed 238 that production is not interstate commerce, no matter how closely connected
with it it is. But it has never been held that production does
239
not, under some circumstances, affect interstate commerce.
2 Supra, n. 232.
Op. cit., Edwin S. Corwin, footnote 77, p. 503.
' This seems to be the real basis of Mr. Corwin's criticism of Hammer v. Dagenhart rather than the legalistic objections which he has
urged. Op. cit., Edwin S. Corwin, p. 503, where Mr. Corwin contrasts
the court's definition with his own. .
Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U. S. 245 (1922); Olivenl
Mining Co. v. Lord, 262 U. S. 172 (1923) (mining); Hope Natural Gas
Co. v. Hall, 274 U. S. 284 (1926) (production of natural gas which was
piped directly from the well into pipes leading to interstate pipe
lines); American.ManufacturingCo. v. St. Louis, 250 U. S. 459 (1919)
(manufacturing).
3Utah Power Co. v. Pfost, 286 U. S. 165 (1932), sustaining a tax
on the generation of electricity for sale, barter, or exchange, although
it was transmitted directly into an adjoining state; Champlain Refining Co. v. Corporation Com., 286 U. S. 210 (1932), holding oil production is not interstate commerce.
'wIt is a mistaken theory "that treats the source of injury rather

K. L. J.-9
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Hence by the mere technique of expanding the definition of
interstate commerce to include all traffic between the states the
Court need only recognize the obvious fact that production does
vitally affect that traffic to bring within the control of Congress
all phases of production which materially affect that traffic, for
it is well settled that Congress, within its power to regulate
commerce, may regulate activities which are admittedly no part
of interstate commerce when such regulation is necessary to
promote and foster interstate trade. 240 Hence the decisions
which hold that a State may tax or regulate productive processes, though they burden interstate commerce indirectly, on
the ground that such a tax or regulation is not directly on interstate commerce, afford no criterion of the existence or nonexistence of the Federal power to regulate the same activities
when by doing so it will promote interstate commerce. 2 4. 1 The
test that has been applied in such cases has been whether the
burden placed upon interstate commerce by state action has
been direct or indirect 242 and generally the Court has decided
243
that question merely by affirming one conclusion or the other
although in some cases involving police regulations the Court
has relied upon whether there has been an actual diversion of
traffic from the channels of interstate commerce. 24 4 It does not
necessarily follow, however, from the fact that the burden was
than its effect upon interstate commerce as the criterion of congressional power." Second Employers Liability Cases, 223 U. S. 1, 51
(1912).
HOouston and Texas Ry. v. United States, 234 U. S. 342 (1914)
(intrastate rates); Southern Ry. v. United States, 222 U. S.20 (1911
(safety appliances" on ihtrastate cars); United States v. Ferger, 250
U. S. 199 (1919) (punishment of forgery of bills of lading though no
goods
24 were shipped).
-Reid v. Colorado, 187 U. S. 137 (1902); Houston and Texas By.
v. United States, Ibid.
2 "The tax may indirectly and incidentally affect such commerce,
just as taxation of railroad and telegraph lines does, but this is not
a forbidden burden or interference." Oiver Mining Go. v. Lord, supra,
n. 237.
2
43Di
Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U. S. 34 (1927). The majority
opinion held that a state law requiring a license to sell steamship
tickets to foreign ports imposed a "direct" burden on interstate commerce. Justice Stone, in a dissenting opinion concurred in by Holmes,
J., and Brandeis, J., pointed out that the majority opinion merely
affirmed that the burden was direct which was the question at issue.
244Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U. S. 313, 321 (1890); compare also
So. Ry. v. King, 217 U. S. 524, with Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. BlackwelT,
244 U. S. 310 (1917). In the latter case the same statute as that which
was held valid in the former was, on the facts shown, held invalid.
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held indirect in such cases that the court would hold that
Congress could not regulate the activity if it desired to do so
for there are many instances where the states may legislate
concerning local matters which are closely related to interstate
commerce until Congress steps in and legislates on the matter.
Burdens and obstacles to interstate commerce which Congress may legislate against need not be concerned with the
actual shipment of goods. United States v. Ferger2 4 5 was a
case involving the power of Congress to punish the forgery of
and fraudulent dealing in bills of lading purporting to involve
interstate shipments. It was argued that since no goods were
shipped, the defendant was not within the jurisdiction of Congress. But the Court held that such conduct placed a burden
upon commerce which Congress had the authority to remove.
There was no factual showing of the existence of any actual
burden. But if the Court feels that no such burden exists it
may hold the legislation unconstitutional. 24 6 Hammer v. Dagenhart247 can easily be put aside if the Court feels disposed to
hold that the commerce power exends to the regulation of production. That case can be explained by saying that Congress
was not attempting to remove a burden from interstate commerce, but to remove a burden from the children by withholding
the channels of interstate commerce from those who employed
children. Congress should leave out references to altruistic
motiyes and rely on the effect of the conduct it seeks to regulate on interstate trade and commerce, and if it can be shown
that local activities burden interstate commerce, the fact that
such activities are also regulated is immaterial and Hammer v.
Dagenhart would not apply.
It is not so easy to put aside the philosophy upon which
the Child Labor Case is decided. In that case the Supreme
Court said:
"The maintenance of the authority of the state over matters purely
local is as essential to the preservation of our institution as is the conservation of the supremacy of the Federal power in all matters entrusfed to the nation by the Federal Constitution.
"In interpreting the Constitution it must never be forgotten that
the nation is made up of states to which are entrusted the powers of
2- 250 U. S. 199 (1919).
2
"Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 161 (1908).

2T upra, n. 232.
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local government. And to them and to the people the powers not expressly delegated to the National Government are reserved.. Lane
County v. Oregon, 7 Wall. 71, 76. The power of the states to regulate
their purely internal affairs by such laws as seem wise to the local
authority is inherent and has never been surrendered to the general
government."m

The only basis upon which the Court can sustain legislation by which the power of Congress is extended to the control

of production opens up a precedent by which the powers of
Congress may be extended to the regulation of all business and
the powers of the State may be restricted to closer and closer
quarters.

Once the Court evinces a willingness to admit evidence compiled for the purpose of showing the effect of local or
sectional business conditions upon interstate commerce and to
listen to the economic interpretation of such evidence by coun-

sel for the different interests, the Tenth Amendment can be
practically nullified.
On the other hand, the Court can keep the situation well

in hand by very simple devices.

It may recognize the depres-

sion 2 4 9 and rely on the economic "emergency"

2 50

which gives

25 1
rise to conditions in production that unduly affect commerce.

Or it may merely affirm that the subject of regulation does or
does not unduly burden commerce and give supporting arguments.

25 2

The Court will not be entirely without precedent if it desires to control producers for it is well settled that producers
211d. See also, New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U. S. 262, 278
(1932). "Plainly a regulation which has the effect of denying or unreasonably curtailing the common right to engage in a lawful private
business . . . cannot be upheld consistent with the 14th Amendment.
Under that Amendment nothing is more settled than that it is beyond
the power of a state under guise of protecting the public (to) arbitrarily interfere with private business or prohibit lawful occupations
or impose unreasonable and unnecessary restrictions upon them." Jay
Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U. S. 513 (1923).
2-9
See Minnesota v. Blasius, 54 Sup. Ct. 34 (U. S. 1933).
20
and although an emergency may not call into life a
power which has never lived, nevertheless emergency may afford a
reason for the exertion of a living power already enjoyed." Wilson v.
New, 243 U. S. 332, 348 (1917); Cf. United States v. Calistan Packers,
Inc., 4 Federal Supp. 660 (D. C. Calif. 1933).
"-"When producing concerns fail . . . and communities dependent
upon profitable production are prostrated, the wells of commerce go
dry." Per Hughes in Appalachian Coals v. United States, 288 U. S. 344
(1933); Victor v. Ickes (D. C. Sup. Ct. 1933).
"aThis device is used in determining whether a State tax or
regulation is a direct or indirect burden on interstate commerce. See
supra, n. 243.
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who seek to restrain interstate commerce are subject to Federal
2 53
Logically if producers do, in fact, burden or recontrol.
strain commerce the power to regulate would be the same since
Congress does not depend on intention for the source of its
power. But this brings us back to the determination of a fact
question; and logic will have to be sacrificed to the extent of
requiring the fact to be proved unless we are prepared to "embark on an uncharted sea" of unprovable economic fact. As
between openingthe court to proof of the actual effect on interstate trade of a producing group and reliance on affirmation by
25 4
the court, the latter seems preferable.
Assuming that the court is willing to expand the commerce
power to the regulation of production, the next question is how
extensive this regulation can be. Logically it should only extend to such aspects of production as unduly affect interstate
commerce. 25 5 Here again it will be necessary to rely upon the
good sense of the Court after it has seen the Act in action.
REGULATION

OF PRODUCTION-DUE

PROCESS

It is well settled that the power to regulate commerce is,
like all' other express powers, subject to the limitations of the
Fifth Amendment. 250 Hence, even if the commerce power extends to the regulation of production, such regulation as Congress undertakes must be consistent with the requirements of
the Fifth Amendment. In Wilson v. New 257 the Court said:
"The powers possessed by the government to deal with a subject
are neither inordinately enlarged or greatly dwarfed because the
power to regulate interstate commerce applies. This is illustrated by
the difference between the much greater power of regulation which
may be exercised as to liquor and that which may be exercised as to
flour, dry goods and other commodities. It is shown by the right ...
to prohibit lottery tickets, and by the obvious consideration that such
Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268 U. S. 295 (1925).
Cf. Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of IndustrialRelations of Kansas,
262 U. S. 522 (1922).
=Employers Liability Cases, 207 U. S. 463 (1908). The Court
said that because a company engages in interstate commerce all of its

business is not thereby subjected to the control of Congress. Congress
practically determines, through the Commerce Commission, what constitutes an interference with interstate commerce. See William C.
Coleman, The Evolution of Intra State Rates: The Shreveport Rate
Cases, 28 H. L. R. 34 (1914-15).
2"Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U. S. 312
(1893); Adair v. United States, 208 U. S.161 (1908).
7243 U. S. 332 (1917).
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right to porohibit could not be applied to 2)ig iron, steel rails or most
of the vast bodies of commodities&m (Italics the writer's.)

This dictum, if adhered to literally, would defeat the Federal program of control since the power to regulate production
is essentially based upon the power to prohibit commerce in
those commodities which are not produced in compliance with
the conditions imposed by Congress. But the difference between
the regulation of liquor and food commodities is obviously one
of degree and hence a change in facts may make it just as
2 9
necessary to regulate the one as the other. 5
People v. Nebbia260 has apparently dealt a death blow to
the doctrine that business may be divided into categories of
businesses which are and those which are not affected with a
public interest. The theory of that case seems to be that regulation of any business or activity is limited only by the requirement that the phase of the activity regulated bears a substantial
relation to the welfare of the public. 2 61 If the Court looks at
the Agricultural situation as a whole and considers each control measure a part of a larger plan to raise the purchasing
power to those engaged in agricultural pursuits by removing
surplus production, it will find no difficulty in holding that the
industry sufficiently affects the welfare of the public to warrant
262
regulation.
Under the due process clause, the important question in
any particular case will be whether the method used is arbitrary or discriminatory. To what extent must individual equities and property *rightsbe recognized? It will hardly be main-Id. 346, 347. Cf. Edwin S. Corwin, Power to Prohibit Commerce,
18 Cornell L. Q. 477 (1933).
Block v. Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135 (1921).
Supra, 'n. 89. Of course the Court may swing back to the oldT
theory since the decision was by a divided court. It is important to
note, however, that the majority opinion did not rely upon the doctrine
of emergency to support the legislative power to regulate the price of
milk and it expressly stated that the business was not in the nature of
a public utility.
"Price Control, like any other form of regulation, is unconstitiltional only if arbitrary, discriminatory or demonstrably irrelevant to
the policy the legislature is free to adopt, and hence an unnecessary
and unwarranted interference with individual liberty." Nebbia v.
People, supra, n. 89.
"The question of price dominates trade between the States.
Sales of an article which affect the country-wide price of the article
directly affect the country-wide commerce in it." Board of Trade v.
Olsen, 262 U. S. 140 (1923).
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tained, for example, that Congress can exercise the same degree
of control over production as it can over the carriers themselves. Can Congress, for example, recapture excess production under the theory of Dayton Goose Creek Ry. v. United
States ?263 A farmer cannot gauge his production accurately
due to weather conditions, insect pests, and soil differences. An
attempt to comply with his quota may find him with a crop
largely in excess of his expectations. Can the government appropriate this excess without compensation? When property
is used for anti-social purposes it may be indirectly confiscated, 20 4 and regulations which destroy much of its value are
permissible in the public interest, 2 5 but when condemnation is
resorted to compensation must be paid. The provision in the
Cotton Control Act placing a tax of 50 per cent of the market
price on the ginning of the excess together with the provision
that the government may buy it and pay 55 per cent of the
market price 266 approaches very closely to condemnation at a
price of 55 per cent of its value. It may be technically distinguished since the farmer is not compelled to sell and may
hold it over and apply it under his next year's quota if the Act
is still in effect.
The most obvious objection to the form of control set up
by the Cotton Control Act is that the method by which the individual quota is determined is wholly arbitrary. Since there is
no common denominator to which the production of all the
crops under control may be reduced each crop must be handled
separately. 267 How can a non-discriminatory quota be determined for each crop? In view of the different amounts of
property controlled by each individual would an equal quota
for each be non-discriminatory? Peoples Petroleum Producers
v. Smith205 holds that proration on this basis is wholly arbi'43263 U. S. 456 (1924) sustaining the power to recapture excess
profits to aid the weaker roads.
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 629 (1887).
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Company, 272 U. S. 365 (1926) sustaining a zoning ordinance which destroyed much of the value of the land.
- Op. cit., Sec. 24.
' It has been suggested that production control associations should
be formed to handle all the crops in a country, thus centering attention on the whole farming business rather than on individual crops.
Planning for the Future, Report of the Administration of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, p. 273 (19.3-34).
X81 Fed. Suppl. 361 (1933), noted in I Geo. Wash. Law Rev. 399
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trary because it bears no relation to capacity. Since each producer contributes to the flow of commerce according to his total
production, a quota which bears no relation to his capacity
would seem to be discriminatory. If the basis for regulation of
individual production is its effect on interstate commerce, the
individual quota should be based upon a standard which bears
some relation to the extent his uncontrolled production would
affect interstate commerce. Production over a past period of
years has no relation to the effect present production will have
on interstate commerce except in so far as it has aided in the
contribution to the existing surpluses and this consideration
would require a smaller quota for those who have raised the
most in the past if it is to be considered at all. Past capacity
to produce obviously has no relation whatever to the effect that
present production will have on interstate commerce. Hence
the standards set up in the Cotton Control Act, previously discussed in relation to classification for taxation, would have no
reasonable relation to the purpose for which the classification is
made and hence seems to result in a denial of due process of
law. 269 ft has been suggested that a quota based upon pres(1933). Compare Wilziarmette Lumber Co. v. Waztek, U. S. Law Week.,
Feb. 6, 1934, at 39 (D. 0. 1934), noted in 43 Yale L. J. 827 (1934) involving a quota under the N. R. A. Lumber Code in which all mills
were restricted to a thirty-hour operating week. Some of the mills
were operating on a double and some on a single shift. If different
equipment was required, the allotment seems somewhat unfair, but as
all mills were allowed to operate to capacity for an equal period, the
allotment does bear some relation to the ability of each producer to
affect interstate trade. The allotment was upheld as the most equitable
that could be made.
See Airway EZectric Appliance Corporation v. Day, 266 U. S. 71,
(1924), in which the court held that a fee required of a foreign corporation for the privilege of doing business, though it need not be measured by the exact value of the privilege, must bear some relation to
the value of such stock. The court said that the number of shares not
subscribed or issued has no relation to the privilege held by the plaintiff .

.

. and it is not a reasonable measure of such a fee.

Just as

authorized stock bears no relation to the value of the privilege, so past
production or capacity bears no relation to the present effect of present
production on interstate commerce. Compare Interstate Transit, Inc.,
v. Lindsey, 283 U. S. 183 (1931), 'Which presents a situation parallel to
Congress' power to regulate production because of its effect on interstate commerce. The case involves the power of a State to tax interstate busses because of their effect upon the State highways. The
court holds that the busses which are admittedly instruments of interstate commerce are taxable but being valid only if compensatory, the

charge must necessarily be predicated upon the use made, or to be
made, of the highways of the State. A tax based upon earnind capacity
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ent capacity would not be wholly arbitrary since capacity does
bear some relation to the effect of individual production on
interstate trade.
The California Cling Peach Marketing Agreement and
License illustrates a more direct method of controlled output
than the Cotton Control Act and depends entirely on the commerce power for its validity. It involves the outright licensing
2 70
of canners with a definite quota assigned to each applicant.
The authority for licensing the peach industry is derived from
Section 8, sub-sections 2 and 3 of the A.A.A. which authorizes the
Secretary of Agriculture to enter into marketing agreement
with processors, associations or producers, or others engaged in
handling agricultural products in the current of interstate commerce and to license them to prevent unfair practices or charges
that conflict with the policy of the Act. The agreement provided for a limitation of the pack to 10,000,000 cases and for
an allocation to all canners who made application, based upon
previous sales record, potential sales ability and outstanding
contractual commitments. 271 This seems to be a much fairer
basis than that provided in the Cottoi Control Act except for
the fact that no standards are set up by which it can be determined what weight is given to each factor. The constitutionality of the basis of allotment would largely depend upon
the way it is administered. The Act was sustained by J. St.
Sure in the District Court of California. 2 72 Had the case been
appealed it would have presented some nice Constitutional questions. One of the provisions in the License is that each canner
must pay $5.00 per ton subject to such additional assessments as
shall be necessary to raise enough money to pay the farmers
$15.00 per ton for all peaches which are unharvested due to the
limitation of the pack. It is very doubtful if the A. A. A. authorizes any such requirement as it expressly limits the License to
such terms, not in conflict with existing acts of Congress, 273 as
of the busses was therefore held to have no reasonable relation to the
purpose for which the tax was permissible.
""Supra, note 5.
"'Ibid.
The A. A. A. and the License were upheld as a whole in United
States v. Caiston Packers Inc., 4 Fed. Supp, 660 (D. C. Calif. 1933),
noted in ;9 Iowa Law Rev. 376 (Jan. 1934).
This would seem to subject the License to
23Op. cit., Sec. 8 (3).
the antitrust Laws although Marketing. Agreements are exempted.

Id., Sec. 8 (2).
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may be necessary to eliminate unfair practices and charges.2 74
However, if the Court construes the act to authorize such conditions in the License, it raises, besides the question how great
the burden upon engaging in activities connected with interstate
27 5
commerce may be. This goes far beyond Nebbia v. People
which upheld the right of a State to fix the price of milk for
under the license agreement the sale prices of peaches are not
only fixed but the price which shall be paid the grower as well
and the additional requirement that growers must be paid by the
canners for peaches left unharvested. This provision seems to go
2 76
far beyond such a case as Nobel v. State Bank of Haskell
which sustained a small levy on all banks for a mutual deposit
insurance fund. It seems to come closer to a case like Chicago,
M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Wisconsin where it was held that a State
law requiring that the occupant of a lower berth be given the
enjoyment of the space occupied by the upper berth when it was
unoccupied was a deprivation of property in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. It is difficult to see why canners can
be compelled, as a condition to entering a useful occupation, to
buy all the peaches that are grown by the farmers especially
since it was not necessary in order to assure the public an adequate supply. This seems to go even beyond the Dayton Goose
Creek277 case in which the recapture of excess profits from
operating a common carrier was upheld, for it applies regardless
of profits, and the canner of peaches can hardly be treated as a
27
Federal public utility. 8
Another possible basis of attacking regulation of production or the validity of the individual quota is to show that it is
confiscatory. Congress cannot require a carrier to charge rates
that will effect a confiscation of its property or deny a reasonable
-Refusal to pay for peaches never received can hardly be either
an unfair practice or charge under the most liberal construction of
those terms. Federal Trade Cor. v. Gratz, 253 U. S. 421, 427 (1920).
"The words 'unfair competition' are not defined by the statute and
their meaning is in dispute. It is for the courts, not the commission,
ultimately to determine as a matter of law what they included. They
are clearly inapplicable to practices never heretofore regarded as opposed to good morals because characterized by deception, bad faith,
fraud or oppression or as against public policy because of their dangerous tendency to unduly hinder competition or create monopoly."
-5iSpra, n. 89.
6219 U. S. 104 (1910).
1 Supra, n. 263.
218 See People v. JYebbia, supra, n. 89.
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return on its -investment. On principal it would seem equally
obvious that Congress could not constitutionally limit the volume
of tragic on a road to such a degree that the property would
be confiscated. Logically it would seem that the same rule would'
apply to the property of farmers. In view of the many quotas
and differences in investments and in operating efficiency, an attempt to apply the intricate rules of rate-making to each individual farmer would be ludicrous. But no insurmountable
legal difficulty is involved at this point. In Public Service Com.
v. Utilities Co. 2 79 the plaintiff sought to enjoin the enforcement

of a specific, as distinguished from a maximum rate. The plaintiff and a competitor were both public service corporations engaged in serving the same city. There were not enough customers to return a profit to both companies. The plaintiff contended that it amounted to confiscation to prohibit it from cutting prices in order to drive its competitor from the field. The
Court held that the plaintiff could be required to charge a
reasonable price and if confiscation resulted it was due to competition and not to the rate.
By a parity of reasoning it can be argued that a producer
may be required to limit his production to areasonable amount
and if he fails to make a return it is because of competition and
other factors and not because of the reduction but in spite of it.
This argument would not be very convincing, however, if the
producer could show that prior to the forced reduction he was
able to operate at a profit. In such a case, it would be necessary
to resort to the doctrine that individual hardships cannot in28 0
validate legislation which is.enacted for the public welfare.
While Congress has no general welfare power as such, the delegated powers are intended to be exercised for the promotion of
the general welfare. This being so, it would seem that the commerce power, like the police power, might be exercised for the
general welfare even though it resulted in a taking of private
'289 U. S. 130. (1933).
:' Grant v. Oklahoma City, 289 U. S. 98 (1933), upholding a city
ordinance requiring the posting of a $200,000 bond signed by a surety
company authorized to do business in the state before engaging in
drilling oil within the city limits. The plaintiff objected because he
could not satisfy the conditions required by the surety company. He
Insisted that to require the bond and to allow the surety company to
fix the conditions denied him due process.
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property without compensation. 28 ' Radio Commission v. Nelson
Brothers2 82 is a case in which the interests of the public are
held to be paramount to those of the individual in the regulation of interstate commerce. The Commission was empowered
to license broadcasting stations and allocate time and frequencies according to public convenience, interest or necessity. The
plaintiff's license was revoked and the frequency on which he
was operating assigned to another station. To the plaintiff's
objection the court said:
"This court has had frequent occasion to observe that the power
of Congress in the regulation of interstate commerce is not fettered
by the necessity of maintaining existing arrangements which would
conflict with the execution of its policy, as such a restriction would
place the regulation in the hands of private individuals and withdraw
from the control of Congress so much of the field as they might choose
by prophetic discernment to bring within the range of their enterprise."
CONCLUSION

The taxing power as a means of controlling production affords no satisfactory method of controlling collateral economic
questions which necessarily arise. There are no insuperable
legal difficulties involved in extending the commerce power to
the regulation of all phases of production which are closely related in an economic sense with interstate commerce. In deciding this question, legal precedents are not as importantf as social
philosophy.2s 4 Federal control of production, if upheld, will
mean an abandonment of the principle of dual sovereignty leaving state's rights pretty much an empty shell and it will involve
the definite acceptance of constitutional change by judicial
evaluation of social needs as well as by amendment.
From the ordinary citizen's point of view, the position which
the Supreme Court takes regarding due process of law is of far
greater importance than the proper division between State and
Federal jurisdiction. The fundamental question involved is
NobeZ v. State Bank of Haskell, 219 U. S. 104 (1910) "...
it
would seem that there may be other cases besides taxation in which
the share of each party in the benefit of a scheme for mutual protection is sufficient compensation for the correlative burden that it is
compelled to assume." Grant v. City of Oklahoma 289 U. S. 266 (1933).
289 U. S. 266 (1933).
Id. 282.
SSee, Sharp, Movement in Supreme Court Adjudication, 46
H. L. R. 361, 795 (1933).
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the extent to which individual freedom of action and use of property may be restricted by the total of the governing powers for
the purpose of promoting general economic welfare.
Irrespective of the position the Supreme Court takes, such
legislation is bound to leave a lasting impression on our social
philosophy. Much has been done which can never be undone.
In the long run the Supreme Court cannot stem the tide, though
it may momentarily deflect it from its course. It remains to be
seen in what direction the Supreme Court will steer.

